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There is now a worldwide consensus that climate change has become a global challenge that 
requires international action to be solved. Due to the international legal principle of state 
sovereignty, which declare that states have sovereign right to exploit their own resources, and, 
consequently, the right to be free from interference over their exploitation
1
, the different states 
in the world must be in consensus regarding the content of an international treaty addressed to 
tackle the climate change in order to ensure global participation. 
International legal matters are complex, and cannot be considered or addressed properly 
without taking account of different states‟ political, cultural, economical and scientific 
concerns
2
. One main question of international law-making is whether or not the rules and 
standards in agreements should be set on a uniform basis or be differentiated to take account 
of these political, cultural, economic, scientific and ecological circumstances.
3
  
The latter technique, where the regulations in a treaty recognise and respond to real 
differences by instituting different standards for different states or groups of states, is referred 
to as „differential treatment‟, and has been defined as “...the use of norms that provide 
different, presumably more advantageous, treatment to some states.”
4
 Differential treatment 
has been described as “the most effective as well as the most controversial” of the techniques 




 When studying differential treatment, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change
6
 (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol
7
 to the Convention, generally referred to as the 
climate regime, are especially interesting as differential treatment in favour of developing 
countries serves as a cornerstone herein. Today, the climate regime serves as an operational 
platform of principles, rules and mechanisms addressed to meet the challenges of climate 
                                                     
1
 Phillippe Sands: Principles of International Environmental Law, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2005, at 237. 
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 See Lavanya Rajamani: Differential treatment in International Environmental Law, Oxford University Press, 




 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18(Part II)/Add.1, Rio de 
Janeiro, 29 May 1992[Hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
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change. The UNFCCC have received 194
8
 instruments of ratification, and 190
9
 states, as well 
as the EC, have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. With almost universal involvement, the climate 
regime is generally considered to be the most successful international environmental 
agreement – for which the extensive differential treatment favouring developing countries is a 
core explanation. With the current differentiated treatment, developing countries are not 
committed to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under the current climate regime. 
 
However, according to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) there is “. . .high agreement and much evidence that with current 
climate change mitigation policies and related sustainable development practices, global 
GHG emission will continue to grow over the next few decades”.
10
 This clearly calls for a 
more efficient approach in order to meet the ultimate objective of the Convention, set out in 
Article 2, which is to stabilise “. . .greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. Although 
there is no consensus among the parties on what should be considered „dangerous 
interference‟, the IPCC has forecasted that a rise of global temperature higher than 2 degrees 
Celsius over the next century is the upper limit.
11
 This limit was recently recognised by 
several head of states when signing the Copenhagen Accord.
12
 In order to prevent a global 
temperature rise higher than 2 degrees Celsius, enhanced mitigation actions in both developed 
and developing are necessary, which again call for adjustments of the current differential 
treatment. 
 
In 2007, at the thirteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP.13) in Bali, the Bali 
Action Plan was adopted to define new issues to prepare for the negotiations on a new 
agreement. One important element in this process was to consider new ways to include 
emission reductions in developing countries in the climate regime. Therefore, The Bali Action 
Plan and later negotiations indicates a willingness of the developing countries to take on 
further commitments under the regime, which again give a general expectation of further 
involvement from the developing countries to limit or reduce their emissions of GHGs. A new 
agreement was expected to be adopted at COP-15 in Copenhagen in December 2009, however 
no consensus was reached. Yet, the COP stated that it is still the aim to adopt a new 
agreement at the next COP in Mexico.  
As the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012, and amendments to the 
UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol needs at least three fourths of the parties to ratify the 
                                                     
8
 For updated status of ratification, see: 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (Last visited May 28, 
2010.) 
9
 For updated status of ratification, see: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php 
(Last visited May 28, 2010.) 
10
 IPCC: Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms3.html. 
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 At the official UNFCCC website it is stated that the IPCC has recognised a upper limit of 2-2.4 degrees 
Celsius temperature rise, see http://unfccc.int/press/fact_sheets/items/4988.php. 
12
 In Decision 2/CP.15 the Conference of the Parties took note of the Copenhagen Accord, and it was presented 




amendments before they enter into force
13
, which is a time consuming process, the outcome 
of the next meeting, the sixteenth Conference of Parties (COP.16) in conjunction with the 
sixth session of Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (CMP.6), will be of immense importance in order to avoid a gap between the first 
and the second commitment periods. If developed countries commit themselves to take on 
mitigation commitments, or „mitigation actions‟ in a so called „post-2012 agreement‟, this 
would represent adjustments to the current differential treatment in the climate regime that 
could enable a more efficient approach to tackle the climate change.  
 
2. Presentation of the paper 
A. The purpose and the scope 
 
In light of the scientific research indicating that the current mitigation policies are insufficient 
in order to meet the objective of the UNFCCC, the purpose of the paper is to study the current 
differential treatment in the climate regime and assess if it has gone too far according to the 
boundaries of differential treatment identified in the literature. If this is the case, and 
enhanced mitigation action in developing countries therefore is needed, what are the future 
options as approaching a new agreement under the climate regime? 
In order to assess the current differential treatment, one must study what differential treatment 
is, why it has such a central role in the climate regime, and how this has affected the 
architecture and development of the regimes provisions. The „what‟ and „why‟ will be the 
contents of Part II, while the scope of Part III is to show how the present differential treatment 
has lead to differential commitments for the parties, and secondly, how the differential 
treatment has influenced the design of the Kyoto Protocol‟s compliance mechanism. The 
boundaries of differential treatment will be presented and assessed in part IV with the aim to 
see if the current differential treatment has gone too far and needs adjustments. Finally, in part 
V, I will present three possible future options for enhanced mitigation action in developing 
countries, one already existing mechanism and two proposed new regulations, and try to 
assess how these new options could represent adjustments to the current differential 
treatment. 
B. Limitations, definitions and sources 
 
The climate regime is indeed complex, with many regulations, procedures, mechanisms and 
institutions. To give a comprehensive explanation of all elements would be far outside the 
scope of this paper. When presenting the current differential treatment in the climate regime, 
the focus will thus be on the most relevant provisions that differentiate between developed 
and developing countries. However, in Part IV and V, where the boundaries of differential 
treatment and new proposals are assessed, I will also look at other options for differentiation 
among the parties. Further limitations or clarifications are presented below in the paper when 
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considered necessary.  
 
The terms „developing countries‟ or „non-Annex I countries‟ are not defined in the UNFCCC 
nor the Kyoto Protocol, but are used within the climate regime and in the literature as a 
reference to the countries which are party to the Convention but not included in the Annex I 
of the UNFCCC. The terms „developed countries‟, „industrialised countries‟, „industrial 
countries‟ or „Annex I countries‟ are used as a reference to the countries  included in Annex I 
of UNFCCC.  The Annex I countries consists of countries that were members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992, and several 
states with economies in transition (EITs).
14
  In full recognition of the dangers of over-
generalisation and reductionism, these terms will be used in the paper in the same sense. The 
word „countries‟ may also be replaced with „nations‟ or „states‟ without changing the meaning 
of the terms. The Annex II countries are those countries who are party to the Convention and 
listed in Annex II, which consists of Annex I countries except those with economies in 
transition. (EITs). Those countries listed in Annex I in the UNFCCC that are committed to 
limit or reduce their emissions under the Kyoto Protocol and therefore are listed in Annex B 
herein,  will in this paper be referred to as „Annex I counties with commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol‟ or any similar term, or simply called „Annex I countries‟ or „developed 
countries‟ if it is clear out of the context that it is these „Annex B countries‟ I refer to.  
Mitigation is defined as „human interventions to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases by 
sources or enhance their removal from the atmosphere by “sinks”,
15
 and “sink” refers to 
forests, vegetation or soils that can reabsorb CO2.
16
 This is the also the meaning of the term in 
this paper. 
The paper will be based on relevant literature, the treaty texts and the later adopted 
amendments. Additionally, the negotiation text prepared for the parties towards a new 
agreement will be used in the last part. The interpretation of these the international legal
17
 
documents, will be based on the general principle of Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention which reads that a treaty is to be interpreted „in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object 
and purpose‟.
18
 Regarding the literature, the work of Rajamani and Honkonen are especially 
relevant, as they have studied „differential treatment‟ and „the common but differential 
responsibility‟ in international environmental law. 
PART II: A Deeper Study of Differential Treatment 
1. Defining ‘differential treatment’ 
                                                     
14
 Facts from the UNFCCC‟s webpage, available at http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php.   
15





 Even the negotiation text is not a part of the treaties, the same principle will be used. 
18




Differential treatment is defined as “the use of norms that provide different, presumably more 
advantageous, treatment to some states.” 
19
 Differential treatment in international treaties is 
sometimes needed since the alternative, equal rules for all parties to a treaty, could lead to 
substantively unjust outcomes because this approach overlooks the situation of the more 
disadvantaged parties.
20
 With differentiated treatment, the need for worldwide participation 
can be balanced with the need to address and be sensitive to individual countries‟ special and 
relevant conditions.
21
 In other words, the aim with differential treatment is to ensure effective 
and efficient implementation of international treaties and at the same time achieve justice and 
substantive equality.
22
 In order to ensure just outcomes, the differential treatment must 
recognise and respond to real differences between the countries.
23
 
Norms embodying differential treatment can have a number of legal characters and varieties.  
According to Rajamani, differential treatment can be expressed through soft law or hard law, 
be implicit or explicit, and, it can have inherent and/or instrumental value
24
 The differential 




In the climate regime, the notions of differential treatment is reflected in the part of the 
regulations that are to be considered soft law,
26
 such as the preamble, but also in the 
commitments which are only legally binding for Annex-I countries.
27
 Norms of differential 
treatment is implicit when “...the norms themselves provide identical treatment to all states 
but their application permits considerations of characteristics that might vary from country to 
country”
28
. In the climate regime, there are implicit differential norms as, for instance, the 
same type of non-compliance could be treated with different consequences because the 
Facilitative Branch is to take into account the parties common but differentiated 
responsibility,
29
 and explicit as the quantified emission limitation and reduction obligations 
are only applicable to specific countries.
30
 Differential treatment has inherent value when it is 
applied either to recompense to some states for past injustices or to reflect enhanced 
responsibility of other states for past wrongs, and instrumental value if it is instituted to 
further equality between states
31
. In the climate regime the differential treatment has inherent 
value because developing countries, who are responsible for the historic emissions of 
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 Rajamani, supra note 4, at 1. 
20
 Tuula Honkonen: The Common but Differentiated Responsibility Principle in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: Regulatory and Policy Aspects, Kluwer Law International, 2009, at 39. 
21




 Rajamani, supra note 4, at 1. 
24
 Lavanya Rajamani: The Nature, Promise, and Limits of Differential Treatment in the Climate Regime, in 
Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Volume 16, Oxford University Press, 2007, [hereinafter 
Rajamani in YbIEL] at 86-87.  
25
 Please note that the examples will be further elaborated below in the paper. 
26
 „Soft law‟, unlike ‟hard law‟ are not legally binding per se, but point to ”…the likely future direction of 
formally binding obligations, by informally establishing acceptable norms of behaviour…”, see Sands, supra 
note 1, at 124. 
27
 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3. 
28
 Rajamani, supra note 4, at 8. 
29
 See Part III.2 of this paper. 
30
 Those listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. 
31




greenhouse gases, must take on stringent commitments to make up for their contribution to 
the climate change problem. The differential treatment in the climate regime has also 
instrumental value as it recognise that different states has dissimilar ability to contribute in the 
fight against climate change and therefore commit those with the necessary resources to 
support those without.  
Furthermore, there are three types of differential treatment, which are all contained in the 
regulations of the climate regime.
32
 These are: provisions that differentiate with respect to 
central obligations
33
; provisions that differentiate in relation to implementation
34
; and, 
provisions that grant assistance.
35
 
The differential treatment is, as now explained, truly a cornerstone in the climate regime. It 
contains all types and variety of differential treatment. Furthermore, the effectiveness of 
developing countries‟ implementation is linked with the developed countries‟ implementation 
of their commitments to support the developing countries implementation with financial 
resources and technology.
36
 The differential treatment in the climate regime is for these 
reasons unlike any other environmental treaty.
37
 This can primarily be explained by the 
central role of the principle of common but differential responsibility in the regime. This 
principle and the other explanations of the extensive use of differential treatment in the 
climate regime will now be presented below. 
 
2. Reasons for the extensive use of differentiated treatment in the climate 
regime 
A. The legal basis 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) serves as the doctrinal 
basis for differential treatment, as the essence of differential treatment within international 
environmental law is captured by the CBDR principle.
38
 In other words, when a treaty 
provides differential treatment to different parties this is a result of the application of this 
principle. In general, the climate regime is seen as „the clearest attempt to transform, activate and 
                                                     
32
 Ibid., at 191. 
33
 Id. Rajamani explains that central obligations refer to those, when executed, fulfill the purpose and objective 
of the treaty, which in the climate regime are the mitigation commitments. Only the developed countries are 
legally bound by mitigation commitments in the climate regime, as will be further elaborated in Part III.1. of this 
paper. 
34
 For example, the softer approach to non-compliance for developing countries, explained in Part III.2 of this 
paper.  
35
 E.g. the commitments of Annex II parties to provide financial resources and technology transfer to developing 
countries, see UNFCCC, supra note 6, Art 4.3 and 4.5. This will be presented in Part III.1of this paper. 
36
UNFCCC, supra note 6, art 4.7, see Part III.I of this paper. 
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(i) The CBDR principle in general 
 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, accepted as „the pillar of 
equity‟
40
, is a relatively new principle in international law. It has developed from the 
application of equity in general international law, and the recognition that special needs for 
developing countries must be considered and reflected in the architecture process, application 
and interpretation of rules of international environmental law.
41
 The roots of the principle can 
be traced back to the ideas expressed in the Stockholm Declaration,
42
 however, the 1992 Rio 
Declaration
43
 was the first international instrument to express the phrase, followed by the 




Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration reads that “States shall cooperate in a spirit of global 
partnership, to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth‟s 
ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States 
have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the 
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of 
the pressure their societies place on the global environment and the technologies and 
financial resources they command.”  
This principle crystallises the regulations in previous instruments which encourage universal 
participation in treaties by providing incentives in the form of differentiated standards and 
„grace periods‟, and financial provisions to meet at least some of the costs of implementing 
the treaty obligations.
45
 The phrase recognizes two indicators of differentiation between 
                                                     
39
 See Rajamani in YbIEL, supra note 24, at 97, where she refers to Christopher C. Joyner, in Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities (2002), at page 358. 
40
 Sanya Vashist: CBDR Principle and Recent Developments at the UNFCCC: Ensuring Fairness to Developing 
Countries, Centad, 2009, in Foreword. 
41
 Sands, supra note 1, at 285.  
42
 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, in Report of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, UN Document: A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (Stockholm, 1972). For example, 
Principle 1 recognise that man has the”. . . responsibility to protect and improve the environment . . .”; Principle 
21 expresses that states have”. . . responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”; Principle 
23 that stress the importance “. . .  in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing in each country, and 
the extent of the applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be 
inappropriate and of unwarranted social costs for the developing countries.”; and, finally, Article 24 which reads 
“International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the environment should be handled in a 
cooperative spirit by all countries, big and small, on an equal footing.”. 
43
 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, in Report of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), 
generally referred to as the Rio Declaration.  
44
 Albert Mumma and David Hodas: Designing a Global Post-Kyoto Climate Change Protocol that Advances 
Human Development, 20 Geo. Int‟l Envtl. L. Rev. 619, 2008, at 629. 
45




developed and developing countries, namely the „different contribution‟ to the environmental 
degradation, and different capacity to take the response measures,
 46
 as it is stated that 
developed countries command „technologies and financial resources‟.  
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities can be seen as a recognition of all 
states‟ responsibility to cooperate in developing the law addressed to protect their common 
interest in the global environment, yet, the degree of  their responsibility is differentiated 
among them, based on their actual differences – in particular their different contribution to the 




There two elements in the CBDR principle: the common responsibility and the differentiated 
responsibility, will now be explained individually. 
(a) Common responsibility 
The term „common‟ have been interpreted to reflect that all countries are, or risk to be, 
affected by global environmental problems,
48
 and is rooted in the principle of cooperation
49
, 
which indicates that states are obliged, in the spirit of solidarity, to cooperate in preventing 
transboundary environmental degradation.
50
 The notion of „common responsibilities‟ 
originated from well established notions in international environmental law which indicate the 
existence of collective interest, such as „common concern‟ and „common heritage of 
mankind‟.
51
 Despite the different formulations, they share the common consequence that 
certain legal responsibilities are attributable to all states,
52
 including the legal responsibility to 
prevent damage to the „commonality‟, the specific environmental problem, in question. 
However, the extent of this common responsibility and the legal consequences of the 
responsibilities will vary for each resource and instrument in question.
53
  
A general definition of „common responsibility‟ is that it “. . . describes the shared 
obligations of two or more states towards the protection of a particular environmental 
resource, taking into account its relevant characteristics and nature, physical location, and 
historic usage associated with it.”
54
 „Common responsibility‟ calls for universal participation 
in the international community and for each state to take their individual share of the burden 
to improve the global environmental problems.
55
 As global environmental problems cannot be 
solved effectively without global participation, corresponding common responsibilities arise 
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 Rajamani, supra note 4, at 130. 
47
 The definitions of the CBDR principle vary to a certain degree in the litterature, but the reality of them are the 
same, See: Sands, supra note 1, at 286, Rajamani, supra note 4, at 130, Mumma and Hodas, supra note 44,at 629, 
Honkonen, supra note 20,at 1 and Birne, Boyle and Redgewell: International Law and the Environment, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, at 133. 
48
 Honkonen, supra note 20, at 1. 
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 The principle is for example stated in Principle 24 of the Stockholm Declaration, and Principle 7 of the Rio 
Declaration.  
50








 Sands, supra note 1, at 286. 
55




as a fundamental part of the CBDR principle.
56
 When applied, the common responsibility 
entitles, or may require, all concerned states to participate in international response measures 
aimed at addressing environmental problems.
57
  
(b) Differentiated responsibility 
The differentiated responsibility is a direct response to the differences between states in 
regards of how they are, or are anticipated to be, affected by an environmental problem and 
their capacity to take action to respond to this problem.
58
 In addition to different capacities of 
states, the term „differentiated responsibilities‟ originates from the differing contributions of 
states to environmental problems.
59
  
Differentiation seeks to balance the need for universal participation and cooperation regarding 
global environmental problems, on one hand; and the need to be sensitive to individual states‟ 
special and relevant circumstances, on the other. Consequently, differential treatment does not 
only seek to ensure justice and substantive equality, but also more effective and efficient 
implementation of international environmental agreements.
60
 
Common and differentiated responsibility must be seen together, despite the word „but‟ 
between the two elements in the principle. „Common‟ responsibility does not mean that the 
responsibilities have to be the same for all.
61
  Differentiated responsibility indicates that the 
grade of common responsibility is individual for each state.  
When applied, the differentiated responsibility transforms into differentiated environmental 
standards based on various factors relevant to the scope of the specific treaty.
62
 In simple 
words, the application of the CBDR results in differential treatment in form of differentiated 
obligations for different parties to a treaty. In addition, it has been argued that the CBDR 
principle entitles developed countries to give certain countries assistance in the 
implementation of the treaty through financial assistance and by technology transfer.
63
 This 
latter type of differential treatment can be referred to as „re-distribution of resources‟
64
 or 
„provisions that grant assistance‟, as mentioned above. In this relation, the principle arguably 
can lead to an undesirable „double-duty‟ for developed countries.
 65
 For instance, in the 
climate regime developed countries are not only obligated to take on the more stringent 
standards but also significantly contribute to the reduction of GHG emissions in developing 
countries.
 
Yet, others argue that it is unclear whether the responsibility for developed 
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 Id.  
57
 Sands, supra note 1, at 286. 
58
 Honkonen, supra note 20, at 2. 
59
 Rajamani, supra note 4, at 136. 
60
 Honkonen, supra note 20, at 4. 
61
 Ibid., at 2. 
62
 Sands, supra note 1, at 288-289. 
63
 Honkonen, supra note 20, at 3. See also Birnie, Boyle and Regdewell, supra note 47, at 133, where they state 
that the CBDR principle can be ‟seen to define an explicit equitable balance between developed and developing 
states in at least two senses: it allows for different standards for developing states and it makes their performance 
dependent on the provisions of solidarity assistance by developing states‟. 
64






countries to assist developing countries actually can be regarded as a responsibility embedded 
in the CBDR principle.
66
 This can be supported by the fact that neither of the references to 
CBDR principle in the Rio Declaration and the UNFCCC addresses this issue.
67
 However, 
even if the responsibility to assist developing countries cannot be interpreted out of the CBDR 
principle alone, developing countries unquestionably have such assistance responsibilities. 
The parties to the UNFCCC have agreed to adopt assistance commitments,
68
 and, 
furthermore, it is expressed in the Convention that effective implementation of developing 
countries are dependent on the implementation by developed countries regarding their 
obligations to support developing countries.
69
 However, many developed countries prefer to 
see assistance to developing countries as „a matter of pragmatism or benevolence, rather than 
an outgrowth of the CBDR‟.
70
 
(ii) The CBDR principle in the context of the climate regime 
The UNFCCC have been said to be „based on the principle of CBDR‟.
71
 In the current 
regulations under the climate regime, the CBDR principle is expressed in the recognitions in 
the preamble; stated as one of the core principles;
72
 explicitly expressed in the commitment 
provision;
73
 and it has been stated in numerous COP decisions.  
 
 In the context of the climate regime, the „common responsibility‟ of all parties is to cooperate and 
participate in the fulfilment of the ultimate objective: to prevent „dangerous interference with the 
climate system‟,
74
 by implementing their common obligations.
75
 At the same time, the parties‟ 
responsibility is clearly differentiated, as I will present below in part III.  
In the climate regime, the CBDR-principle is stated in a similar language in Article 3.1 of the 
UNFCCC: “The parties should protect the climate system . . . on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. 
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change 
and the adverse effects thereof.”  
The formulation of the CBDR principle in Article 3 of the UNFCCC have „prompted various 
interpretations regarding what the leadership role of the North actually entails‟.
76
 The softer 
language in this article compared to Article 7 of the Rio Declaration is a result of the general 
uncertainty regarding the legal status of principles that are incorporated into the operative 
parts of a treaty.
77
 As Sands sums up, principles “embody legal standards, but the standards 
                                                     
66
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 See for example: UNFCCC, supra note 6, art. 4.3 and 4.5. 
69
 UNFCCC, supra note 6, art.4.7.This will be further discussed below in Part II.1. 
70
 Brunnée, supra note 66, at 326. 
71
 Honkonen, supra note 20, at 122. 
72
 UNFCCC, supra note 6, art 3.1. 
73
 Ibid., art. 4.1. 
74
 UNFCCC, supra note 6, art 2. 
75
 Which primarily is stated in UNFCCC, supra note 6, art. 4, and Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, art.10. 
76
 Honkonen, supra note 22, at 122. 
77




they contain are more general than commitments and do not specify particular actions, unlike 
rules.”.
 78
 The fact that legal principles can have legal consequences coloured the negations 
on whether a section on „Principles‟ should be adopted or not.
79
 Heated discussions, where the 
United States and some other „common law‟ countries expressed their concern that the 
requirements included in Article 3 might be subject to the dispute settlement or create specific 
obligations beyond those set out in Article 4 and other commitments provisions under the 
Convention,
80
  resulted in the adoption of a text where the CBDR principle is written in 
„discretionary and guiding‟,
81




Despite the fact that the principle stated in Article 3.1 itself does not represent a substantive 
legal obligation, it has significant force within the climate regime
83
, and it is not without legal 
effects.
84
 First, the principle is relevant a relevant tool to interpret and implement the current 
provisions under the climate regime. Secondly, the common but differential treatment 
principle is, inter alia, recognised in the preamble; adopted as one of the core principles of the 
Convention;
85
 and expressed in the commitment provision.
86
 Because the CBDR-principle 
was adopted in, and now serves as, a core principle of the framework convention – the 
starting point and building blocks for further development of the climate regime – the CBDR 
principle will continue to be the primary principle guiding the architecture of new provisions 
under the climate regime, and, therefore, continue to be the core foundation of the burden-
sharing arrangements.
87
 This can be supported by pointing at some examples of the CBDR 
principle‟s major influence on the development of the climate regime so far, for instance the 
statement of the principle in relation to the compliance mechanism and the arrangement of 
this mechanism,
88
 as well as the reference to, and application of, the principle in the Kyoto 




B. The practical basis: Achieving universal participation  
From the beginning of the international environmental dialogue, there has been a sharp 
dissonance between developed and developing countries, based on the different historical, 
economic, and political realities.
90
 The primary disagreement between developed and 
developing countries has been on who should take the responsibility, in what measure, and 
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 For instance, the use of ‟should‟ instead of ‟shall‟ indicates the softer legal status.  
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under what conditions to contain global environmental degradation
91
.  This so-called North-
South division have existed since the origins of modern international environmental law at the 
UN Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm in 1972. While the 
industrialised countries‟ focused on global environmental ethic and protection, developing 
countries‟ focused on their need for further development.
92
 Over the time, this ideological 
deadlock has been solved through the compromise that environmental protection is not 
necessarily incompatible with economic development.
93
 The principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities can be seen as a way to formally integrate the environment and 
development at the international level.
94
 The recognition of the CBDR principle, resulting in 
the use of differential treatment in favour of developing countries in the climate regime, has 
therefore served as the key element in achieving almost universal participation. When 
developing countries‟ challenges, such as lack of resource, capacity and insufficient 
infrastructure were taken into account, and, their need for further development was 
acknowledged, developing countries were willing to sign the climate change treaties. 
 
C. The factual basis: Relevant differences 
 
As explained above, differential treatment shall recognise and respond to  relevant differences between 
countries. The principal differences that existed at the time where the UNFCCC was 
constructed and thereby were relevant to the question of how the differential treatment should 
be divided between countries, have been identified in the literature. This was summarised and 
presented in the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC).
 95
 Based on this, I will now present the core differenced between developed 
and developing countries that at the time were considered relevant differences, which can 




The differential treatment in favour of developed countries is first and foremost based on their 
different levels of wealth.
97
 Out of this, other core differences arise due to the connection 
between wealth, consumption and emissions of green house gases. High level of wealth 
enables consumption of resources that involve emissions of greenhouse gases in their 
extraction, processing and application.
98
 Since the ultimate objective
99
 of the UNFCCC calls 
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for reduction of GHG emissions, differences regarding the nature of countries‟ GHG 
emissions, and consequently, differences regarding the effort and affects emission reduction 
obligations would impose,
100
 are of special relevance. While rich nations‟ GHG emissions 
primarily is related to use of personal cars, central heating and energy embodied in a wide 
variety of manufactured goods, emission from poor countries generally are linked to basic 
needs such as energy for cooking, keeping warm and agricultural activities.
101
 In other words, 
there is a division between „luxury emissions in developed countries and „survival emissions‟ 
in developing counties, and, as a result, the affects of mitigation action will be fundamentally 
different.
102
 This serves as a main explanation why the climate regime imposes stricter 
obligations on the developed countries and softer treatment to developing countries. 
Furthermore, the differential treatment was a respond to the industrial countries contribution 
to climate change. The historic emissions of GHGs are relevant since cumulative past 
emissions account for the build-up of gases in the atmosphere and therefore contributed to the 
climate change.
103
 The historic contribution to the total build-up from the poorer regions have 
been modest.
104
  That this was considered relevant is supported by the recognition in the 
preamble of UNFCCC which states that: “[...] the largest share of historical and current global 
emission of green house gases has originated in developed countries”. Historically developed 
countries are responsible for two-thirds of the cumulative emissions.
105
 When the provision of 
UNFCCC was designed, the industrial countries also counted for the largest share of the GHG 
emissions at that time.
106
  
The countries‟ capacity to respond to climate change also differs widely. Developed 
countries, because of their technical development and economic wealth, will tend to find it 
easier to deal with the costs of the affects of climate change, as well as the cost for measures 
to halt climate change.
107
 Developing countries must deal with their immediate economic and 
social problems, their short-term needs, before they can make investment to avert a global 
problem that might manifest itself in the future.
108
 Therefore, a general concern of developing 
countries is that strict mitigation obligations could limit their further development. 
Developing countries special needs and priorities are recognised in the climate regime 
through favourable treatment. It is even stated in the operational part of the Convention that: 
"economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding 
priorities of the developing country Parties".
109
 In addition, as expressed by the IPCC, some 
countries are “. . . strong nationstates, with a large degree of societal consensus and strong 
institutions that can formulate and implement policy effectively [while others] might be riven 
by internal differences and have fragile governing institutions that may be unable, or 
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unwilling, to formulate and implement effective policy. . . ”.
110
 Evidence that such 
considerations were relevant when forming the climate regime can be found in the preamble 
of UNFCCC, which reads: “standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of 
unwarranted economic and social costs to other countries, in particular developing countries”. 
In close relation to the different capacities are the differences between developed and 
developing countries regarding how, and to what degree: their natural resources will be 
affected by climate change; how dependant countries are on these affected natural resources; 
and their institutional and social capacities to adapt to climate change.
111
 In short, developing 
countries are generally more vulnerable to the affects of climate change. 
When designing the UNFCCC, the parties responded to these differences between developed 
and developing countries through the extensive differential treatment in favour of developing 
countries in the treaty. This differential treatment has continued along with the further 
development of the climate regime. The negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol was founded on 
the principle of CBDR
112
 and the Protocol therefore furthered the differentiation.  
The reasons for the division between developed and developing countries are generally 
summed up as differences regarding their (nature and degree) of contribution to the climate 
change, and their capacity to tackle it. In other words, the differences embedded in the CBDR 
principle regarding their differentiated responsibilities.  
 
D. The philosophical basis: Justice 
Notions of fairness and equity rooted in traditional moral philosophy have been referred to by, 
and served as inspiration for, negotiators in the global environmental debate. Even if fairness 
and equity notions are not openly expressed, moral notifications serves as fundamental 
justification for the CBDR principle and differential treatment.
113
  
(i) Equality for equals, inequality for unequals 
Rajamani, as well as Honkonen, points out that differential treatment can be sourced to the 
visions of philosophers like Aristotle, Nietzsche and Freund, which all stressed the 
importance of unequal treatment of unequals and equal treatment of equals in order to achieve 
justice.
114
 This vision implies proportional treatment, and, as Freund has formulated: 
“Proportionality requires that for some purposes differentiation must be made and requires 
that, when made, these should be relevant to a legitimate avowed criterion, such as merit, 
need, contribution, or agreement”.
115
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This philosophical notion of achieving justice through proportional treatment can be seen as a 
key idea behind the differential treatment in the climate regime, where the CBDR principle is 
applied to make a country‟s commitment more just in relation to those of others.
 116
 Since the 
regulations under the climate regime take account of different states‟ contribution to the 
climate change and their different capabilities, the CBDR principle and the differential 
treatment in the climate regime, Rajamani notes, is in keeping with this vision of justice that 
requires that those similarly situated are treated similarly and those dissimilarly situated are 
treated dissimilarly to the extent of dissimilarity.
117
  
(ii) Restoring equality 
The philosophical basis for the CBDR principle can also be traced to the notion of restoring 
equality. Developed countries industrialised and hereby became the main contributors to 
climate change at time when developing countries went through colonisation and therefore 
not had the same socio-economic benefits. Yet, developing countries are equally, or even 
more, affected by the climate changed caused primarily by developed countries 
industrialisation and are now need to share the burden of limits on economic development in 
order to prevent dangerous interference with the climate system.
118
  Justice in this relation 
would require that „those who have benefited the most from the process that lead to the 
creation of the problem bear an unequal burden for addressing the problem.  
The use of differential treatment in the climate change and the justification for applying 
differential commitments has been oriented towards making up for past wrongs and giving 
developing countries the same opportunities to make use of resources as the developed 
countries enjoyed for so long without any restrictions related to emissions of GHGs.
119
  
The differential commitments for the parties to the climate regime, where developed countries 




The elements of justice and equity embedded in differential treatment have also been a 
promoter for the practical reason to apply differentiated treatment: universal participation. As 
Rajamani explains, “When a regime is perceived as being just, it encourages grater faith in, 
and voluntary compliance with, it. The burden-sharing arrangement in the climate regime is 
in essence an equitable compact, and it should, in theory, promote voluntary compliance”.
121
 
Despite the fact that differential treatment „in theory‟ ensures justice for all parties and 
therefore should promote voluntary compliance, it has been, and still is, controversial to some 
states. The differential treatment in the climate regime does not represent an internationally 
unified understanding on how and why mitigation and adaption burdens should be 
apportioned.
122
  For instance, the differentiated commitments for developed and developing 
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countries in the Kyoto Protocol was one the of the main reasons why the United States, 
declined to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
123
 The United States expressed that it failed to secure 
the “meaningful participation” of key developing countries in emissions caps.
124
 President 
Bush expressed that the Kyoto Protocol “exempts 80 per cent of the world, including major 
population centers such as China and India, from compliance”.
125
 The US Senate voted 95-0 
not to support the Kyoto Protocol unless developing country commitments to reduce GHGs 
emissions were included in the treaty.
126
 Furthermore, countries like Australia, Canada, Japan, 
New Zealand, Russia, and the EC have all been sceptical to the extent of differential treatment 




Therefore, as Brunnée concludes: “The concept of common but differentiated responsibilities 
sketches the parameters of a debate about global justice. However, it does not currently 
constitute a genuine principle of global justice.”
128
 One could therefore say that differential 
treatment can be rooted in notions of justice and be applied with the aim to ensure global 
justice, however, all parties will not automatically agree that the differential treatment actually 
ensures justice for all. 
To sum up, differential treatment in the climate regime is applied to enable and motivate 
universal participation by giving favourable treatment to developing countries, based on 
relevant differences between the parties – of which their different contribution to climate 
change as well as their different capacity to tackle it is of core relevance. Finally, as it is built 
on notions of justice, it should result in a more just outcome than what equal rules for all 
parties would achieve. 
PART III: Differential Treatment in the Climate Regime      
1. Differential commitments under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
A. The commitments for all parties under the UNFCCC 
The commitments of the parties to the UNFCCC are stated in Article 4. According to Article 
4.1, which is addressed to all parties, the common commitments  are, inter alia, to: register 
their national emissions of GHGs;
129
 formulate, implement and  publish national programs 
containing measures to mitigate climate change and measures to facilitate adaption to climate 
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 promote sustainable development and conservation and enhancement of sinks and 
reservoirs of GHGs;
131





take to take climate change considerations into account in their policies and actions;
134
 and to 




Article 4.1 is written in an obligatory language, „shall‟. However, it also states that the parties 
should take into consideration their “. . .common but differentiated responsibilities and their 
specific national and regional development priorities, objective and circumstances. . .‟. By 
including the CBDR principle and that certain circumstances  are to be taken into account, the 
language herein indicates that the requirements of the parties, and their responsibilities to 
implement the listed commitments, are differentiated among the parties, even though the 
commitments are addressed to „all‟. The language is also vague and without clarifying 
definitions and standards. There is no detailed information on, for instance, what is required 
of a „national program‟ in order to comply with this commitment. In other words, these 
commitments have a soft law approach,
136
 and thereby permit different implementation by 
different states. Even though the principle of pacta sunt servanda states that all treaty 
obligations are legally binding,
137
 the imprecise and contingent nature of these commitments 
makes them unenforceable from a practical standpoint.
138
 Consequently, one could say that 
these commitments are voluntary and contingent.
139
 
Another common obligation is stated in Article 12, namely reporting to the Conference of the 
Parties (COP).
140
 However, the requirements regarding the contents of the information to be 
reported and the time frames for when these rapports shall be communicated to the COP, are 




B. The additional commitments for developed countries under the UNFCCC 
The additional commitments in Article 4 are only applicable to the Annex I and Annex II 
counties. The Annex I parties are committed to limit their anthropogenic GHG emissions, and 
to protect and enhance their greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs to “. . .demonstrate that 
developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic 
                                                     
130
 Ibid., para. 1(b). 
131
 Ibid., para. 1 (d). 
132
 Ibid., para. 1 (c). 
133
 Ibid., para. 1 (g). 
134
 Ibid., para. 1 (f). 
135
 Ibid., para. 1 (j). 
136
 Kevin A. Baumert: Participation of Developing Countries in The International Climate Change Regime: 
Lessons for the Future, in 38 Goe. Wash Int‟l L Rev. 365, 2006, at 383. 
137
 It is stated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art 26 that ”Every treaty in force is binding upon 
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”, Vienna Convention, 23 May 1969, in force 27 
January 1980,  reprinted in 8 ILM 679 (1969). 
138
 Baumert, supra note 136, at 383 
139
 Ibid, at 382. 
140
 UNFCCC, supra note 6, Article 12.1.  
141






 Furthermore, the Annex-I countries are, inter alia, committed to: 
communicate information to the Conference of the Parties (COP) on their „policies and 
measures‟ to reduce emission of GHGs with the aim of returning to their 1900 levels;
143
  to 
coordinate relevant economic and administrative instruments with other Annex I countries;
144
 
and, identify and review their own policies and practices “. . . which encourage activities that 
lead to greater levels of anthropogenic [GHG emissions] that would otherwise occur. “
145
  
These commitments are also written in obligatory language, however, there are no quantified 
targets on how much the countries should limit or reduce their emission reduction, no 
timetables or details on how it should be carried out. In other words, even these commitments 
are not enforceable. This must be seen in relation to the fact that the UNFCCC is a framework 
convention, in other words a first step in the architecture of a new climate regime. The 
UNFCCC is generally considered a „quasi-target‟ or „quasi-timetable‟
146
. Despite the lack of 
legally binding obligations, the commitments clearly encourage parties to reduce and limit 
their GHG emissions, and it could be regarded as an important statement of the general aims 
of what should be achieved by the parties to the treaty.  
In addition to mitigation commitments, the Annex I countries listed in Annex II (Annex II 
countries) are committed to provide „financial resources‟ to the developing countries in order 
for them to be able to fulfil their commitments to communicate with the COP
147
, and 
resources needed by the developing countries to implement their commitments covered by 
Article 4(1).
148
 Annex II countries are also obligated to “. . .take all practicable steps to 
promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, [technology transfer to other parties], 
particularly to developing countries, to enable them to implement the provisions of the 
Convention.”
149
 The Annex II Parties shall also financially assist developing countries that are 
particularly vulnerable to adverse effects of climate change
150
. 
In line with the other commitments in Article 4, these provisions are written in a language that 
makes their precise content limited, including phrases like „all practicable steps‟ and „as 
appropriate‟. The provisions do not define precise terms and conditions, which makes it 
unclear how far any real obligations are created,
151
 and, consequently, the „effectiveness of 
their implementation is difficult to monitor‟.
152
  
Therefore, the actual obligation regarding this provision is not to ensure that technology 
transfer actually takes place, but that Annex II countries take practicable steps to transfer 
technology.
153
 Furthermore, the commitment to provide financial resources is limited to the 
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developing countries implementation of specific commitments, such as reporting, and the 
costs must be „agreed‟ to by the developing country in question and the operational entity of 
the financial mechanism.
154
 This diffuse requirement makes it difficult to determine non-
compliance. Birnie, Boyle and Redgewell conclude that it is „doubtful whether at the best‟ 




C. The link between developed and developing countries implementation 
Developing countries ensured to include their expectations of strong obligations from 
developed countries to assist them, as it is stressed in Article 4.7 that: “the extent to which 
developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the 
Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their 
commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology”.  
 This provision, referred to as the climate regime‟s „linking-clause‟, was accepted without 
much debate and without information on how it should be interpreted.
156
 Therefore, it is 
unclear whether this provision withdraws the commitments of non-Annex I countries as long 
as the Annex I countries fail to provide them the necessary financial and technical assistance, 
or whether the non-Annex I countries would still be committed to comply regardless of the 
Annex I countries‟ implementation of their assistance commitments.
157
 Rajamani points out 
that, in order to be in line with the CBDR principle, the non-Annex I countries would still 
have the responsibility to fulfil their commitments,
158
 because the „common responsibility‟ to 
protect the environment still exists, even if Annex-I countries fails to fulfil their 
commitments.
 159
 Some say that the linking-clause, at least, give means to developing 
countries to put pressure on developed countries to provide assist.
160
 From this perspective, 
they see it as irrelevant to what extent developed countries are bound by these assistance 
commitments.
161
 – If developed countries want developing countries to actively participate in 




Another important element in Article 4.7 is that it notes that the success of developing 
countries implementation of their commitments is related to their economic and social 
development, and that poverty eradication is their „first and overriding priorities‟. By 
including this phrase, it underlines the recognition in the preamble with the similar contents. It 
has been argued that this phrase in the operational part of the treaty could be read as an 
exception from the commitments, so that developing countries will be able to claim that they 
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D. Differential commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Since the framework convention needs to be supplemented with more detailed rules and 
regulations, Article 15 opens for amendments to the Convention, and Article 17 made it 
possible for the COP to adopt protocols at any ordinary session. Such a protocol, namely the 
Kyoto Protocol, was adopted at the third COP session, COP-3, and was signed in 1997, 
although it was first set into force in 2005.  
There are overall little references to the developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol, once 
again clearly reflecting that the developed countries are to „take the lead‟
164
 in the fight 
against climate change. Although Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol commits „all parties‟,  it is 
emphasised that it does not represent new commitments for developing countries. Rather, it 
„reaffirms‟ the common commitments in Article 4.1 of the Convention, and re-state the 
introduction phrase herein
165
, and seeks to advance the implementation of these commitments 
„taking into account Article 4, paragraphs 3, 5, and 7, of the Convention.
166
  
The core article in the protocol is Article 3, which provide many of the Convention‟s Annex I 
countries with individual quantified emission limitation and reduction obligations 
(QUELROs). The Annex I countries listed in Annex B of the Protocol received individual 
targets referred to as „assigned amounts‟, with “the view to reducing their overall emission of 
[ the six Annex-A-listed GHGs]
167
 by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels in the commitment 
period 2008 to 2012”.
168
 With the adoption of these quantified targets and timetables, the 
mitigation commitments of the developed countries hereby became substantial and legally 
binding.   
In order to enable observation of compliance with the emission reduction targets, Annex-I 
Parties are also committed to put in place a national system for estimating anthropogenic 
emission
169
, and, to provide the information needed in their annual inventory and national 
communication to the COP to ensure and demonstrate compliance with their commitments
170
. 
This implementation of the parties will then be review by the expert review teams.
171
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When the Kyoto Protocol required developed countries to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions according to the quantified targets, the implementation of the commitments 
got severe economic impacts. Compliance would demand costly domestically behavioural 
changes and affect the future economic development.
172 
To facilitate Annex I countries in 
meeting their emission targets, and at the same time promote the private sector, the Protocol 
included three market -based mechanisms,
173
 referred to as flexible mechanisms, namely Joint 
Implementation
174
  (JI), Emission Trading
175
 and the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM).
176
 The CDM is so far the only regulation in the climate regime that involves 
mitigation activity in developing countries. This mechanism will be further elaborated in Part 
V.I of this paper.  
To sum up, while all parties are required to undertake certain activities, including forming 
national programmes, cooperate and exchange relevant information, only the developed 
countries are committed to provide financial resources and technology transfer and obligated 
to limit and reduce their GHG emissions under the current climate regime. 
Even though the many of the commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are not enforceable, 
non-compliance with these commitments may be subject to compliance procedures, as will be 
elaborated below. 
 
2. Differentiated non-compliance consequences  
„Compliance‟ refers to the degree to which countries in fact implement their obligations under 
the legally binding treaty.
177
 Non-compliance can include failure to give effect to substantive 
norms; or to fulfil procedural requirements; or to fulfil an institutional obligation.
178
 The 
commitments in a treaty is not much worth unless the parties implement them, and thus, one 
could say that equally important as creating the commitments, also effective mechanisms and 
procedures must be designed in order to ensure compliance of the commitments. As stated by 
Sands: “Non-compliance . . . limits the effectiveness of legal commitments, undermines the 
international legal process, and can lead to conflict and instability in the international 
order.”
179
 Due to the principle of state sovereignty, no state or international institution can 
legally force another state to comply with international law or apply consequences of non-
compliance unless the non-complying state has agreed to such consequences. The parties to a 
treaty must therefore develop and agree on how non-compliance should be regulated in 
relation to the specific treaty.  
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Under the UNFCCC, where the commitments are vague and non-legally binding, the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) was tasked to establish a multilateral consultative process
180
 
with the mandate to resolve questions regarding implementation through a non-judicial 
process „conducted in a facilitative, cooperative, non-confrontational, transparent and timely 




Therefore, the compliance mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol with the objective to “. . 
.facilitate, promote and enforce compliance with the commitments under the Protocol”
 182
 
represented a large step forward. This mechanism is considered the principal mechanism for 
disputes concerning compliance with the Kyoto Protocol and any subsequent commitments.
183
  
It was designed at the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties (COP.7), in what has 
been known as the Marrakesh Accord, and adopted at the first Conference of the Parties 
serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP.1).  
The Kyoto compliance mechanism is a result of a long negotiation process, based on the 
division of political interests in developed countries and developing countries.
184
 As the 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol clearly distinguish between Annex I countries and 
non-Annex I countries, this has also coloured the design of the rules, procedures and 
institutions of its compliance mechanism.  As explained by Ulfstein and Werksman, the 
Kyoto compliance system has elements of both the traditional dispute settlement in 
international treaties and the compliance mechanisms often found in international 
environmental agreements.
185
 The former solve cases of bilateral disputes and has 
enforcement powers. The latter is a compliance mechanism, often with specialised bodies and 
procedures, where the parties report on their implementation and promote resolution of 
compliance problems in a cooperative, rather than adversarial, manner where potential non-
compliance are addressed rather than a later formal case of compliance.
186
 In simple words, 
procedures designed to facilitate rather than enforce compliance. In relation to Kyoto 
Protocol, which has the aim to tackle the global problem of climate change, a case of non-
compliance is best suited to be resolved in an international context rather than through third 
party arbitration or adjunction.
187
 However, the “all facilitative” compliance mechanism can 
be criticised for not ensuring efficient implementation of binding obligations, as the 
consequences of non-compliance are too soft. The compliance system‟s enforcement 
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measures and its due process guarantees
188
 are comparable to those applied by judicial 
bodies.
189
 The Kyoto compliance, thus include both facilitative and enforcement elements. 
Two main institutions are involved when identifying non-compliance, namely the Expert 
Review Teams (ERTs) and the Compliance Committee.
190
 The ERTs are mandated tasked to 
perform a technical assessment
191
 of the information given by the parties regarding 
implementation
192
, as well as requested additional or clarifying information
193
, and assess „all 
aspects of implementation‟ to identify „ and „any potential problems in, and factors 
influencing, the fulfilment of commitments‟.
194
 The Compliance Committee operates through 
a plenary, a bureau and two branches.
195
 The bureau‟s role is to „allocate questions of 
implementation to the appropriate branch‟.
196
 The two branches, the Facilitative Branch and 
the Enforcement Branch, therefore carry out the actual assessment and decisions regarding 
cases of non-compliance. The Compliance Committee consists of twenty members, divided 
into ten members in both branches.  
Especially the composition of the Enforcement Branch was a controversial issue in the 
negotiations regarding whether individuals from non-Annex I parties, which have no 
quantified commitments under the Protocol and who are not subjects for enforcement 
consequences, should sit in judgement of Annex I parties commitments.
197
 However, both 
branches have equally many members from Annex I and non-Annex I countries.
198
 
A. The Facilitative Branch 
 
The Facilitative Branch has the overall task to give advice and facilitation to all the parties in 
implementing the Protocol, and to promote compliance with the commitments „taking into 
account the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
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capabilities‟ and „the circumstances pertaining to the questions before it‟.
199
 This branch 
makes no legally binding determinations of non-compliance.
200
 
Two questions of implementation related to Annex I countries‟ commitments are under this 
branch‟s exclusive jurisdiction. The first is Annex-I countries‟ commitment to strive for 
minimized adverse impacts on developing countries when implementing their emission 
reduction commitment in Article 3 of the protocol
201
. The second is regarding the Annex-I 
countries duty to provide of information on the use of the flexible mechanisms.
202
  
In addition, the Facilitative Branch has the mandate to promote compliance and provide for 
„early warning of potential non-compliance‟ by providing advice and facilitation related to 
compliance with the emission reduction commitment of Annex I countries in Article 3(1) of 
the Protocol up to the second commitment period.
203
 This responsibility is designed not to 
overlap with the tasks of the Enforcement Branch which will have the exclusive mandate to 
deal with the parties implementation of the emission limitation and reduction commitments 
after the end of the first commitment period.
204
 
Regarding non-compliance consequences, the Facilitative Branch is responsible to apply 
consequences „taken into account the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities‟, by deciding on the application of one or more possible 
consequences.
205
 These consequences are: to provide advice and assistance to an individual 
party regarding implementation;
206
 to facilitate financial and technical assistance to any Party 
including technology transfer and capacity building;
207
 and, to formulate recommendations to 
the Party concerned, taking into account the link between developed countries compliance and 
developed countries implementation, as stated in Article 4.7
208
 of the Convention.
209
  
As the Facilitative Branch is to take into the CBDR principle and the parties‟ capacities when 
choosing the type of consequence, as well as the circumstances in the specific case, it is 
thereby possible for them to treat a similar case of non-compliance differently. It is thereby 
opened for differentiation between developing and developed countries.
210
   
 
B. The Enforcement Branch 
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While both branches apply compliance consequences, only the Enforcement Branch can apply 




The Enforcement Branch has, unlike the Facilitative Branch, exclusively jurisdiction over the 
legally binding commitments of the Annex-I countries,
212
 as it has the mandate to determine 
whether an Annex I country is in compliance with its emission reduction commitments
213
, the 
methodological and reporting requirements
214
 of the Protocol,
215
 and the eligibility 
requirements in relation to the flexible mechanisms.
216
  
If the Enforcement Branch determines that there is a case of non-compliance, the 
Enforcement Branch is responsible for applying consequences with the aim to restore the 
compliance to ensure environmental integrity, and must provide for an incentive to comply.
217
 
There are several consequences to be applied, dependent on the type of non-compliance. 
Unlike the available consequences that the Facilitative Branch chose to apply, the obligatory 
language “shall” indicates that the Enforcement Branch do not have the mandate to select 
what consequences they may find suitable for a specific case of non-compliance.
218
 Even 
though this makes the consequences more foreseeable and prevents abuse of powers, it will 
mean that all similar types of compliance will be treated similarly, despite the special 
circumstances in the specific case.
219
   
There are specific consequences to be applied whether it is non-compliance with the 
methodological and reporting requirements, non-compliance with the requirements of the 
flexible mechanisms, or non-compliance with the quantified emission limitation and reduction 
obligation targets.  
In case of non-compliance of the methodological and reporting requirements, the 
Enforcement Branch shall form an official declaration of non-compliance and the party will 
be asked to develop a plan consisting of analysis of the reason for non-compliance, measures 
intended to be implemented in order to remedy the non-compliance, and, a timetable for 
implementing such measures. The Party must also provide a progress report on the 
implementation of the plan on a regular basis.
220
  
If there is non-compliance concerning the requirements of the use of flexible mechanisms, the 
Enforcement Branch shall suspend the eligibility of that Party. This could mean that party lost 
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its right to use all the flexible mechanisms, but presumably this consequence only refers to the 
flexible mechanism in question.
221
  As described above in part III.1, the use of flexible 
mechanism are aimed at providing low-cost supplements to domestic emission reductions. If 
this right is suspended, this consequence thereby represents economic loss for the non-
complying party.
222
 However, at a party‟s request, the eligibility can be reinstated under 
certain circumstances.
223
 This is if the Enforcement Branch decides that there no longer is a 




The hardest consequences are those applicable in case of non-compliance with the emission 
reduction obligations. If the Enforcement Branch declares non-compliance with these 
commitments, they shall apply deduction from the Party‟s assigned amount in the second 
commitment period with 1.3 times the amount in tonnes of excess emissions,
225
 and suspend 
the possibility of emission trading
226
 until the Party is reinstated.
227
  The party is also required 
to develop a compliance action plan.
228
 This consequence would obviously have a great 
economic impact as the country would not only be obligated to even stringent mitigation 
commitments
229





C. Differential treatment under the compliance mechanism 
 
By dividing the Compliance Committee into two branches of which only the Enforcement 
Branch have mandate to apply enforcement consequences on the Annex I countries, the  
possible consequences applicable for the parties were differentiated. Furthermore, as the 
Facilitative Branch can apply different consequences to similar types of non-compliance, 
taking into account the CBDR principle and respective capabilities, it is possible to 
differentiate the parties non-compliance consequences under this Branch too. For instance, 
developing countries can be given more financial and technical assistance than a developed 
country, based on their different capacities. Thus, in the creation of this mechanism, the 
parties included both implicit and explicit norms of differential treatment.
231
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Generally, since a party‟s non-compliance to a treaty can be due to a variety of different 
reasons, it is widely recognised that the underlying causes require further attention in order to 
design the commitments to ensure that they are effectively implemented.
232
 Subsequently, 
these underlying causes can therefore also affect the design of the compliance mechanism.
233
   
This is also the case with the Kyoto Protocol‟s compliance mechanism as it recognise and 
respond to the parties‟ differences. Since the developed countries generally lack resources, 
strong institutions and other relevant issues to be capable of undertaking actions to comply 
with a treaty, one could presume that these issues often will be the underlying causes of non-
compliance. On the other hand, the developed countries generally have better wealth and 
development and therefore should be more capable of implementing their commitments. This 
taken into account as only the Facilitative Branch have the mandate to apply „soft‟ 
consequences. 
The division could also be seen in light of the purpose of giving parties commitments: to meet 
the ultimate objective of the treaty, which in the climate regime is to prevent dangerous 
interference with the climate system. If developing countries should be subject to „hard‟ 
consequences, this would not be an efficient approach. If the underlying problem was lack of 
capacity, penalties would not fix this problem. On the contrary, the negative economic and 
political effects of enforcement consequences would only make it even more difficult for the 
developing countries to comply with its commitments. Giving advice, financial and technical 
assistance, on the other hand, could improve the reasons that lead to non-compliance, and 
thereby contribute to the fulfilment of the ultimate objective. Consequently, the „soft‟ 
approach on non-compliance would be a much more efficient method to ensure 
implementation of the developing commitments. Since the Kyoto compliance mechanism 
recognises the problems of developing countries, it thereby takes a sympathetic approach.
234
  
Regarding the enforcement consequences only applicable for Annex I countries, this must be 
seen as reflection of the parties‟ differentiated commitments. When the Annex I countries‟ 
commitments became legally binding under the Protocol, they thereby became enforceable. In 
addition, since a core reason for the differentiated commitments were that the Annex I 
countries had better capacity to take on mitigation action, they should also be able to comply. 
For these countries, economic consequences could in fact improve the efficiency of the 
climate regime as the risk of being “punished” could motivate them to implement their 
commitments. As the main contributors to the climate change problem, it is also decided that 
the Annex I countries should „take the lead‟.
235
 One could therefore also say that their 
responsibility could legitimise that they are subjects to harder consequences. Furthermore, as 
they are the only countries who are committed to reduce their GHG emissions, which is 
directly linked to the ultimate objective of the climate regime, it could therefore be argued 
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that it is even more important that these countries comply, and thus, that the enforcement 
consequences are a way to ensure this. 
When the Protocol‟s compliance mechanism builds on the different capacities and 
responsibilities of developed and developing countries, which is the core of the CBDR 
principle, it therefore designed to ensure an efficient implementation of the commitments. 
However, it has been pointed out in the literature that even though the compliance 
mechanisms builds on the same elements that are embedded in the CBDR principle, it cannot 
be seen as another type of assistance for implementation integrated in this principle.
236
 The 
compliance procedures cannot be considered „burden-sharing‟ because the compliance 
mechanism will not be used if the parties implement their commitments. In fact, the CBDR 




During the negotiations, developing countries negotiators remained united and insisted on 
having a strong enforcement system which was applicable for industrial countries only.
238
 
This could be seen as the developing countries expected that they would be without emission 
reductions indefinitely, so that this compliance mechanism would never apply to them.
239
 
However, as the text regulating the Enforcement Branch is addressed to the Annex I Parties 
with commitments in the Kyoto Protocol, it depends on the status of a party if it can be 
subject for the „enforcement consequences‟, rather than if it is considered a developing 
country or not.
240
  Therefore, if a non-Annex I country would be listed in the Annex I in the 
future, the Enforcement Branch will have the mandate over this country‟s compliance 
automatically.
241
 Yet, as pointed out by Rajamani, it remains to see what the compliance 
consequences will be if the developing countries take on mitigation commitments without 
including themselves in Annex I.
242
  
PART IV: The Boundaries of Differential Treatment 
 
 
The current differential treatment in the climate regime builds on the same distinction that 
was made between developed and developing countries when the UNFCCC was formed. 
However, almost two decades later one can question if the differences that were considered 
relevant at that time, and thereby formed the division between these two groups of countries, 
still is relevant today. One could argue that based on the changed factual situation, the same 
reasons are no longer valid to justify that developing countries should be without any 
substantial commitments to undertake mitigation action on their territories, and that all 
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 This is also supported by Gupta, supra note 124, at 134 
242




developing countries should be treated the same. In other words, one can question if it is time 
to adjust the differential treatment in the climate regime. 
Even though the CBDR principle legitimise differential treatment, it does not imply 
differential treatment „ad infinitum‟.
243
 As Honkonen underlines: “It is evident that situations 
and circumstances of states change over time, and this should be reflected in their 
international commitments. Regimes should never remain static.”
244
 This has lead to many 
heated discussions in the international community regarding which countries should be 
entitled to differential treatment, why, how, and for how long.
245
 Accordingly, the application 
of the CDBR principle, differential treatment, must be based on and applied within certain 
boundaries.  
 
Rajamani has defined the boundaries of differential treatment.
246
 According to her, differential 
treatment must be „measured against three yardsticks‟: differential treatment should not 
„detract from the overall object and purpose of the treaty‟; „it should recognize and respond to 
differences across pre-determined categories‟; and, „it should cease to exist when the 
differences cease exists‟.
247
 I will in the following part use these identified boundaries to 
assess whether the current differential treatment in the climate regime has gone too far. 
 
1. Does the current differential treatment in the climate regime detract from 
the overall objective and purpose? 
 
Rajamani explains this boundary by stating that: “The CBDR principle recognizes the 
existence of a common environmental goal and the need to differentiate between countries in 
the actions required to achieve the common goal. It follows logically that the tasks countries 
undertake, however these are divided between the parties, should in their totality further the 
common environmental goal. If the actions taken in their totality detract from the common 
environmental goal then the differential treatment has gone too far.”
248
 The objective of a 
treaty, in which the common goal of the parties are embedded, will thus set the limits for the 
differential treatment so that it cannot be applied in a wider extent than what is needed to 
enable the fulfilment of the objective. In relation to the climate regime, Rajamani has also 
stated that: “The division of responsibilities will fall foul of the objects and purposes if, and 
only if, the overall target of stabilization cannot be achieved even if both industrial and 
developing countries faithfully implement their part of the bargain.”
249
 
Thus, in order to assess the limits of differential treatment in the climate regime in line with 
this boundary, one could only conclude that the differential treatment had gone too far if all 
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parties had implemented their commitments, in particular that Annex I parties had met their 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol, and the objective – to achieve „stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system‟
250
 – was still not possible to achieve.  
It is clear that the parties have not fully implemented their commitments.
251
 Also, the refusal 
of the US, responsible for about 20-25 percent of the global GHG emission, to ratify the 
Protocol have greatly contributed to the inefficiency of the regime. The fact that there is no 
definition of what is to be considered „dangerous anthropogenic interference‟ in the climate 
regime could also make this boundary difficult to assess. Although, a general view is that an 
upper limit is a global temperature rise above 2 degrees Celsius
252




However, there are still reasons to argue that the current differential treatment, where only 
Annex I countries have mitigation commitments, is insufficient to successfully meet the 
objective. There are many critical voices calling for a new approach in the literature. Mumma 
and Hodas are especially critical as they consider the lack of commitments on developing 
countries in the Kyoto Protocol as a „false articulation of the common but differentiated 
responsibilities‟.
254
 In their view, the original meaning of the principle, “. . .that all nations 
have a duty to protect common resources, but the nature and extent of a nation‟s obligations 
will be equitably allocated, duty being the common denominator. . .”, instead came to be 
understood that developing countries should have no responsibilities to undertake emission 
reductions under the Protocol.
255




Honkonen disagrees regarding their view of the CBDR principle, as she states that such a 
view is a quite strict interpretation of the principle.
257
 She underlines that “[t]he need for 
differentiation may sometimes be so strong that the „common‟ element of the principle is 
forced to assume a very minor role. Still, that does not render the CBDR principle 
inapplicable in this case”.
258
  Yet, she also notes that the historical responsibility of 
developed countries with high GHG emissions has served as an important rationale for the 
current differential treatment, but that CBDR does not mean that developing nations should be 
enabled to follow the same „environmentally destructive path‟.
259
 Rather, she says, the idea of 
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CBDR is that developing countries gradually adopt stricter limitations on their 
environmentally harmful behaviour.
260
 Thereby, she also points out that the differential 
treatment might need adjustments in order to meet the objective. Gupta also notes that the 
current differential treatment allow the large developing countries to grow without 
restrictions, which potentially can make the whole process ineffective.
261
  
Described in a more explicit language, Murphy Et. al. stress that engaging developing 
countries will be critical to success in reaching the goal of the UNFCCC and point at the Stern 
Review, which notes that both leading developed and developing economies must act 
seriously in climate change in order to create a durable impact on atmospheric concentrations 
of GHGs.
 262
  Halvorssen also clearly states that if the major GHG-emitting developing 
countries are not given binding reduction commitments, the CBDR principle will have been 
taken beyond the limits, as the objective of the Convention would be defeated.
263
  
However, more importantly, scientific research most certainly calls for an adjustment of the 
current differential treatment. An increasingly share of the global GHG emission is 
originating from developing countries,
264
 especially the large developing states that are 
experiencing powerful economic growth.
265
 Furthermore, IPCC states that in 2004, the 
developing countries were responsible for 53.6 percent of the global emission of GHGs,
266
 
and that with the current climate change „mitigation policies and related sustainable 
development practices‟, global GHG emission will continue to grow over the next few 
decades.
267
 In fact, already in the Second Assessment Rapport of the IPCC, concluded 
that:“[w]hatever the past and current responsibilities and priorities, it is not possible for the 
rich countries to control climate change through the next century by their own actions alone, 
however drastic. It is this fact that necessitates global participation in controlling climate 
change, and hence, the question of how equitably to distribute efforts to address climate 
change on a global basis”
268
  
These statements clearly indicates that the current differential treatment, where only the 
Annex I countries have substantial mitigation obligations, is insufficient to meet the objective, 
and, thus has gone too far. As climate change will affect most, if not all, countries in adverse ways, 
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they have a common interest in reversing these effects by limiting the global GHG emissions, and 
consequently they should also have a common interest in taking on further action to ensure that the 
objective of the Convention is fulfilled. In order to ensure this, the current differential treatment, 
where developing countries are not committed to undertake mitigation action, therefore needs 
adjustments.  
 
2. Does the current differential treatment recognize and respond to 
differences across pre-determined categories? 
 
Rajamani points out that in order to be in harmony with the notion of justice requiring that 
those dissimilarly situated should be treated dissimilarly,
269
 “[j]ustice would demand that 
treaty commitments incorporate a proportionate reflection of relevant differences not just 
between industrial and developing countries but also between developing countries”.
270
 This 
should be done by recognising the relevant differences in the treaty, along with clear and 
flexible identifications and categorisations of parties based on the relevant differences.
271
 
Honkonen also supports this by stressing the importance of flexibility and dynamism in the 
criteria used for forming categories of countries for differential treatment.
272
 
Although the differential treatment in the climate regime is seen as an outgrowth of the CBDR 
principle, and thus, contribution to the climate change and capacities were considered relevant 
differences when designing the Convention, no criteria are explicitly stated in the Convention 
nor the Kyoto Protocol. Even though Annex I countries listed in Annex B of the Protocol 
were differentiated through individual national targets,
273
 and the climate regime recognises 
the special needs of some countries,
274
the differentiated commitments and favourable 
treatment are simply divided between those who are listed in Annex I,
275
 and those who are 
not – the „non-Annex I‟ or „developing countries‟.  
This established categorisation of countries into developed and developing in international 
instruments has been said to imply an official recognition of the existence of inequalities 
between states.
276
 Furthermore, it has been claimed that as the obligations in the climate 
regime is generally based on the parties‟ economic development, it respects the CBDR 
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 Yet, the differential treatment in the climate regime fails to address relevant 
differences among the developing countries.  
 The non-Annex I countries consists of 149
278
 countries including over 130 members
279
 of the 
Group 77 and China (G77/China), while the rest of the countries do not share a common 
negotiation history.
280
 Although most developing countries have similar historical 
experiences, weak institutions, economic and technological conditions, and most of them have 
low per capita emissions, insignificant total greenhouse gas emissions, and, for most, the 
impacts of climate change are likely to be relatively high, there are indeed important 
differences among them.
281
 For instance, some of the developing countries have low potential 
for future GHG emissions, predominantly African countries, while other countries are large 
„newly industrializing countries‟ with high potential for future GHG emissions, like China, 
India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa.
282
 Some of the non-Annex I countries are considered 
wealthy advanced developing countries, like Bahamas, Malta, Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates,
283
 while others, especially African countries, are poor and „under-industrialized‟.
284
 
Despite the fact that there are vast differences in these countries, the favourable treatment is 
granted them all. This could be linked to the lack of definition of „developing country‟ in the 
climate regime, which has resulted in the fact that all countries not included in Annex I of the 
Convention automatically is considered a „developing country‟. As stated by Myrphy Et. al: 
“These countries represent a large, diverse group that have a variety of needs and required 




As presented in part III.1 above, the current differential treatment in favour of developing 
countries have lead to softer commitments as well as support to the developing countries. 
When this favourable treatment is given to them all, despite their differences, at least two 
problems arise: It could further inequality rather than restore equality, and, it would contribute 
to the inefficiency of the regime to meet the ultimate objective.
286
 
 First, as the equal treatment of all non-Annex I countries enable them all to receive assistance 
and benefits provided in the climate regime, this support could be misdirected to those 
developing countries which do not need it the most. If these resources are constantly 
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misdirected, this indeed further inequality, rather than restore equality among the parties.
287
 
One example of this is the CDM projects. As I will explain below in part V.1., a tendency 
with this mechanism, although supposed to benefit developing countries by ensuring 
sustainable development, is that the projects are carried out in those countries where it is 
easiest and most cost-efficient, and consequently, not in the countries that would benefit the 
most from these projects. Honkonen argue likewise when she points at the lack of definition 
for a developing country could “. . .potentially lead to unjust outcome, since the states‟ right 
and responsibilities rest on an obscure base”.
288
 It could therefore “. . .cause a legitimacy 
deficit in the system and hamper efficient distribution of scare resources, leading to further 
inequality and questioning the legitimacy of the system”.
289
  
Secondly, when all developing countries are subject to the same commitments, the regime 
does not reflect the actual capacity of the developing countries, nor their degree of 
contribution to the climate change. The equal treatment of the unequal developing countries 
therefore reduces the efficiency of the climate regime. Thus, one could argue that the degree 
and nature of their commitments should be differentiated, to better reflect that, at least some 
of, the developing countries could and therefore should be more actively involved to meet the 
objective of the treaty. Rajamani argues in the same direction as she points out that the lack of 
differentiation between developing counties “. . . can prevent identification of those countries 
that bear greater responsibility for contributing to climate change.”
290
 
If the relevant differences among developing countries had been taken into consideration in 
the differential treatment it would be possible to adjust the commitments so that the 
developing countries could take on mitigation actions according to their individual capacity, 
and, furthermore, ensure a more balanced allocation of the support from developed countries. 
Even though developing countries might not warmly welcome differentiation as it could lead 
to restrains on their economic development, differentiation between them through new 
categorisations could better reflect their diverse interests and therefore also be beneficial to 
the developing countries.
291




To conclude, by treating all developing countries similarly, the climate regime fails to be fully 
in harmony with the vision of justice since those dissimilarly situated are actually treated 
similar. Since the climate regime fails to identify the relevant differences and criteria for 
which the differentiated treatment should be based on, it provides equal favourable treatment 
to a wider number of parties then necessary. Thus, the current differential treatment is too 
extensive. 
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3. Have the relevant differences ceased to exist so the differential treatment 
should cease to exist? 
 
Logically, since the differential treatment is based on relevant differences it should only be 
applied as long as the relevant differences exist. As Rajamani points out: “. . .[W]hen the 
relevant differences vanish, differentiation should  cease, or at least the lack of differences 
should be taken into account in fashioning future obligations under the regime.”
293
 Otherwise, 
she argues, the differential treatment would further inequality, which is the opposite of the 
main purpose of differential treatment.
294
  
In the lack of recognised relevant differences or defined criteria regarding which countries 
should be entitled to the favourable treatment in the climate regime, it is difficult to identify 
what differences between the countries should be assessed in relation to this boundary. 
However, as the differential treatment is seen as an outgrowth of the CBDR principle, and 
thus based on the differences regarding historic contribution and capacity, these differences 
must be seen as relevant. 
Obviously, there are still important differences between most of the developed and developing 
countries. The historic responsibility still lays on the developed countries as the main 
contributors to the climate change problem. Furthermore, they generally have higher levels of 
wealth, better access to resources, and more stable institutions than developing countries. 
Based on this, one could say that the division between developed and developing countries‟ 
commitments in the climate regime are legitimised. 
However, some argue that these reasons for differentiation, based on fairness, do not improve 
the effectiveness of the treaties.
295
 Clearly, if the historic responsibility of the Annex I 
countries are exaggerated so that developing countries would still be without mitigation 
commitments – despite their increasingly contribution to the problem as well as capacity to 
tackle it – the differential treatment, as discussed above, would be insufficient to meet the 
common goal. Therefore, the countries‟ current contribution to the climate change problem, 
rather than the historic, and the parties‟ actual ability to take on mitigation action should be 
seen as relevant differences on which the future differential treatment should be based upon.  
Since the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the political and economic situation in some 
developing countries has changed.
296
 As stated in Part II, the Annex I countries historically 
were responsible for two-thirds of the global GHG emissions, which was a major reason why 
only Annex I countries took on mitigation commitments. As the number of developing 
countries contributing to the climate change is now large and increasing,
297
 it could be 
claimed that they too should accept to undertake mitigation action. This is the view of 
Vandenbergh, Ackerly and Forster, for instance, as they state that “Achieving any meaningful 
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climate goal will require a post-Kyoto agreement that all major emitting nations join in and 
comply with over time.”
298
 
Yet, it can be argued that developing countries increasingly contribution to the problem 
should not alone lead to stringent commitments. Poor countries with high GHG emissions 
could still need favourable treatment due to lack of capacity to address the problem, or how 
they are affected by the climate change.
299
 
Even so, since the increased GHG emissions from developing countries often are a result of 
economic development, their capacity to tackle climate changes in many cases will have 
improved as well. As pointed out by Gupta, “. . .some developing countries have become 
„quite developed and should be seen as such.”
 300
 
Several of the developing countries that are members of the G-77, such as China, India, Brazil 
and Indonesia are among the top twenty-five nations with the highest gross domestic product 
(GDP) as well as total emissions.
301
 In other words, some of the countries referred to as 
„developing‟ actually have higher GDP than Annex I countries, as well as higher GHG 
emissions. For instance, countries like Bahamas, Cyprus, Israel, Qatar, and Singapore have 
higher GDP per capita than Portugal, which was the benchmark for inclusion in Annex II.
302
  
That, at least, some of the developing countries should take on mitigation commitments under 
the regime based on these reasons, is therefore widely supported in the literature.
303
 
For instance, Halvorssen notes that since some of the developing countries have grown much 
since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol and now emit more GHGs than some developed 
countries, this should must be reflected in new commitments.
 304
  In her view, the Annex I 
countries have now have taken the lead in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, 
in line with Article 4.2(a) of the Convention, it is time for the developing countries, at least 
the major GHG-emitters, to “follow” with commitments on their own.
305
 
To sum up, the differences between developed and, at least, these fast growing developing 
countries are diminishing, or have even in some cases ceased to exist. According to this 
boundary identified by Rajamani, this would therefore require that the differential treatment 
should be adjusted in the commitments of a new agreement. 
 Having assessed the current differential treatment against the three „yardsticks‟ or 
boundaries, the final conclusion must be that the Annex I countries should no longer be the 
only countries with mitigation commitments if the parties want to meet the objective of the 
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climate regime. The differential treatment in a new agreement should enable enhanced 
mitigation action in developing countries, as well as better reflect the actual differences 
between the parties. This means that the differentiation between developed and developing 
countries should be adjusted, and that developing countries should also be treated differently.  
Therefore, as Vandenbergh, Ackerly and Forster states, “[t]he principal challenge 
confronting climate change policymakers is to allocate the benefits and burdens in ways that 




PART V: Future Options for Enhanced Mitigation Action in Developing 
Countries 
 
As discussed in the previous part, a more active involvement of the developing countries 
regarding mitigation commitments, in addition to enhanced mitigation actions in developed 
countries, will be essential in order to meet the ultimate objective of the climate regime. In 
this part, the focus will therefore be on three options to enable enhanced mitigation action in 
developing countries, and the adjustments of the current differential treatment this will 
represent. I will present the already operational Clean Developing Mechanism before 
presenting two proposed options for new regulations aimed at reducing emissions in 
developing countries, and look for signs of adjustments to the present differential treatment in 
the climate regime.  
 
1. The Clean Development Mechanism 
 
There are several reasons why the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is interesting as an 
option for enhanced mitigation action in developing countries, and therefore interesting in the 
context of this paper.  
First, the CDM is so far the only mechanism in the climate regime aimed at reducing 
emissions of GHGs in developing countries, and could therefore continue to contribute to 
GHG emission reductions in these countries in the future. However, even though the CDM 
already has been operational for a long time, it has increasingly since then been subject for 
critical voices pointing at numerous problems or flaws with the mechanism. These flaws have 
hindered the CDM from reaching its full potential. Therefore, if the problems are solved, the 
mechanism can in fact contribute to enhanced mitigation action in developing countries and 
thereby be an important option in this relation in the future of the climate regime.  
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Secondly, even though it is not explicitly stated in Article 12, the CDM clearly reflects and 
builds on the CBDR principle.
307
 Honkonen describes the flexible mechanisms as „a form of 
realizing CBDR‟.
308
 The parties‟ common „responsibility‟
309
 in this relation is to cooperate as 
both developing and developed countries are actively engaged in the CDM projects in order to 
meet their common goal of climate change mitigation.
310
 While Annex I countries‟ 
participation in the CDM will be in the context of their protocol commitments and their 
responsibility to meet their targets,
311
 the participation of developing countries as host states 
for the projects can be seen as a prolongation of their UNFCCC commitments and their sphere 
of responsibility herein.
312
 Sustainable development can be seen as a commitment that 
developing countries have undertaken in this relation, and, hence, their participation in the 
emission reducing CDM projects contributes to their compliance with this commitment as 
well as contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention.
313
 It has also been argued that 
developing countries through the CDM take on voluntary mitigation commitments since they 
enable low-cost mitigation options for developed countries that otherwise would not been 
possible, and that this could be seen as a first step towards formal targets in the future.
314
  
Thirdly, it is likely that the mechanism will be central also in the future development of the 
climate regime if the problems are properly addressed. Global carbon trading is likely to play 
a central role in any future architecture,
315
and because of its central role in the carbon market, 
the CMD remains an important option for the future development of the climate regime.
316
 
More importantly, the concepts embedded in the CDM – cooperation between developed and 
developing countries, sustainable development and mitigation action in developing countries 
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Finally, the lessons learned from the revealed flaws and insufficiencies with this mechanism 
can serve as important experience when forming the new mitigation regulations in order to try 
to avoid the same problems in the future.
318
  
A full overview of all elements and how the flaws should be addressed is far outside the scope 
of this paper. Thus, in this section, I will give a presentation of the mechanism before 
explaining some of the most central flaws that need to be dealt with if the CDM should be 
considered as an effective and well-functioning option for mitigation action in developing 
countries in a future agreement.  
 
A. The core regulations, institutions and procedures 
 
The basic rules of the mechanism are set out in the Kyoto Protocol Article 12. At the first 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP.1), the parties adopted the rules on the modalities and procedures of the CDM
319
 and 
since then further rules have been adopted by the Executive Board and through decisions by 
the CMP. 
The purpose of the CDM is to assist non-Annex I Parties „in achieving sustainable 
development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention‟, as well as 
assisting Annex I countries to comply with their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments.
320
 The intention with the mechanism is that developing countries will benefit 
from the CDM projects while Annex I countries can use the emission reduction units, 
Certified Emission Reductions
321
 (CERs), they receive from a CDM project to meet their 
emission reduction obligations,
322
as well as trade them in the emission trading marked.
323
 
Both public and private entities within an Annex I country with Kyoto targets may participate 
in a CDM project and thereby receive tradable CERs.
324
  
Emission reductions shall be certified by operational entities based on real, measurable, long-
term benefits, and be additional to any reductions that would have occurred in the absence of 
the certified project activities.
325
 These requirements are generally referred to as the 
„environmental integrity‟ of the CDM.
326
  
This market-based mechanism is build on  the knowledge that all emissions of greenhouse 
gases end up in the atmosphere and therefore potentially will contribute to the global climate 
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change no matter where the gases originally were released, and thus, as long as GHG 
emission reductions actually occur, it does not matter where the reductions are made. The 
CDM serves as a cost-effective supplement to domestic mitigation action for Annex I 
countries to meet parts of their Kyoto-targets, because mitigation projects will generally be 
cheaper to carry out in developing countries.
327
  
The Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting for the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP) have the authority over, and provide guidance to the mechanism and the Executive 
Board (EB), and are primarily tasked to review the other CDM institutions and the 
distribution of the CDM projects and to make appropriate decisions in this relation.
328
 The EB 
has the overall mandate to supervise the mechanism
329
 and are tasked to, inter alia; approve 
new methodologies,
330
 be responsible for the accreditation of the operational entities and 
make recommendations to the CMP for the Designated Operational Entities (DOEs), and 
report to the CMP on regional and sub regional distribution of CDM project to identify 
barriers to their equitable distribution.
331
 The DOEs have the mandate to validate proposed 
CDM projects, and to verify and certify reductions by sources of GHGs.
332
 Each party shall 
designate a national authority for the CDM.
333
 
The Annex I parties will receive CERs based on a two-step procedure before the CDM 
institutions. First, the project must pass the validation and registration process, which is the 
evaluation by the DOEs that a project activity is in line with the requirements of the CDM, 
followed by a formally acceptance by the EB, namely registration.
334
 Secondly, there is an ‟ex 
posed determination‟ by another DOE of the monitored GHG reductions that have occurred as 
a result of the registered CDM project activity, and that it would not have occurred in the 
absence of the CDM project, during the verification period.
335
 If the requirements are 
considered fulfilled, the DOEs formulates a certification report consisting of a request to the 
EB for issuance of CERs equal to the verified amount of GHG reductions.
336
 The issuance 
will then be final fifteen days later, unless a party involved or the EB requests a review of the 
proposed issuance of CERs, limited to issues of „fraud, malfeasance or incompetence‟ of the 
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B. The flaws 
 
As the CDM is a market-based mechanism, the major interest of all CDM participants will 
generally be to achieve emission reductions in the cheapest way possible, and thereby receive 
a high number of CERs.
338
 Honkonen also stress that cost-effectiveness is a very significant 
factor, by some even viewed as the determinative one, and that efficiency „easily becomes the 
primary goal in a project‟.
339
 As pointed out by Voigt, the problems with the mechanism are 
mainly related to structural flaws, which again can be linked to the conflicting interests 
embedded in the objectives and intentions of the mechanism.
340
 As she expresses it: “The 
protection of the CDM‟s contribution to sustainable development and its environmental 
integrity, on the one hand, are counterweighted by demands of procedural efficiency and 
economic feasibility on the other.”
341
 Some of the core problems in this relation will be now 
be explained. 
(i) The flaws in relation to sustainable development 
 
The original intent of the CDM was to encourage development of low-carbon energy 
infrastructure in the developing world through achieving sustainable development goals as 
well as substitution for early retirement of expensive, high-carbon energy infrastructure in the 
developed world.
342
 Although it cannot be read directly out of Article 12, it is embedded in 
the purpose of CDM to achieve sustainable development and benefits for developing 
countries that the CDM projects should enable effective technology transfers,
343
 as well as 
other sustainable development benefits like improved energy efficiency, creation of jobs, local 
community support, and poverty alleviation.
344
  
Other than stating that achieving sustainable development in developing countries is one of 
the purposes of the mechanism, there are no further definitions on this issue in Article 12 of 
the Protocol or in any subsequent COP decisions. Rather, it is left for the host countries‟ 
Designated National Authority (DNA) to set the requirements and assess whether a project 
meets its standards of sustainability so that the project can be submitted for registration by the 
EB.
345
  Once the DNA has approved a CDM project, the sustainability of a project activity is 
no longer part of the review and assessment within the CDM institutions, and therefore not a 
requirement in order to receive CERs from these institutions. Since the primary goal of the 
CDM project participants generally are to achieve economic benefits, studies of the mitigation 
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projects that have been carried out in developing countries show that the investors for these 
projects indeed tend to choose the projects that give a great reduction of emission but 
providing no or few development benefits.
346
  Thus, in order to be attractive host states, 
experience show the host countries have set low requirements for the sustainability of the 
projects, and thus approved projects that not at all, or to a small extent only, achieve 
sustainable development.
347
 This issue was highlighted by some parties already at the eleventh 
session of the COP, pointing out that the types of projects that were most likely to contribute 
to sustainable development in the host countries, such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, 




For instance, Wara points out that the CDM has proffered an exchange of CO2 emission 
reductions in the developed world for reductions of various non-CO2 gases in developing 
countries.
349
 A large amount of the subsidy provided through the CDM are based on large 
projects that capture and destroy high global warming potential (GWP) industrial gases from 
industrial production where these gases are unwanted by-products. Two relatively small such 
industries represented nearly 55 percent of the supply of issued CERs in 2008, while, unlike 
the original intent with the CDM, CO2-based projects such as renewable energy and fuel 
switching from coal to gas, account for less than half of the CER supply to 2012.
350
 
Accordingly, many of the CDM projects do not provide the sustainable development and 
social improvements that were the intentions of the CDM. This illustrates that the CDM 
project participants neglect the aim of achieving sustainable development in order to achieve 
economic benefits.  
Even if the CDM projects had been able to achieve sustainable development in the host states, 
the CDM still would fail to be an eligible mechanism to ensure sustainability in the 
developing world, due to the uneven distribution of the projects among developing countries. 
Since Annex I participants are free to decide in which developing country they wish to 
practice their CDM projects,
351
 they tend to choose locations that guarantee high emission 
reductions at, the least cost, and the least investments risks,
352
 often countries that already 
successfully attract foreign direct investment.
353
  This has lead to an uneven distribution of the 
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CDM projects because of the diverse economic, social and administrative conditions among 
developing countries.
354
 Currently, there are 2153 CDM projects registered by host parties, of 
which 37.44 percent are hosted by China, 23.8 percent in India, 7.94 percent in Brazil and 
5.57 percent in Mexico.
355
 Summed up, 74.75 percent of the CDM-projects are situated in 
four countries.  In regard of regions, 1636 CDM-projects are now registered in Asia and the 
Pacific, 463 in Latin America and the Caribbean, while only 41 projects are registered in 
Africa.
356
 These facts illustrate that the mechanism has not ensured sustainable development 
to all developing countries, „which was promised by the negotiators of the Protocol‟.
357
 China, 
India, Brazil and Mexico are all fast-growing developing countries.
358
 Although their rising 
GHG emissions need to be addressed, their rising economic power should also enable them to 
reduce emissions without support (which also come in conflict of the additional criterion, see 
below). Many poor developing countries, most of which situated in Africa, have weak 
economies, insufficient governmental institutions, and will be affected the most by climate 
change, and, thus, one could argue that this is where sustainable development and the benefits 
from a CDM would be needed the most.
359
 This problem has been has been addressed at 
numerous COPs since Montreal in 2005.‟
360
 Yet, as the numbers clearly show, the CDM 
mechanism has failed to achieve sustainable development in most of the developing world.  
The tendency by the investors to choose the most well proffered, least complicated, and 
cheapest projects to receive CERs has also translated into another problem. It has been argued 
that since developed countries „use up‟ the easiest ways to reduce emission and often even fail 
to ensure sustainable development, the CDM projects could actually make it even more 
difficult for them to carry out mitigation actions, and potentially mitigation commitments, on 
their own initiative in the future.
 361
 This is quite different from the original purpose and intent 
of the CDM: achieving sustainable development and benefits in developing countries, which, 
in contrast to what have happened, should improve their capacity and thereby improve their 
ability to take on mitigation actions. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous part of this 
paper, enhanced mitigation action also in the developing countries are essential in order to 
achieve the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC. If the CDM projects make it harder for 
developing countries to take on the mitigation action, one could thus argue that this would be 
a threat to the efficiency of the climate regime to fulfil the objective, at least if this problem is 
not solved by enhanced support from the developed countries.  
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Thus, even though the parties are to be guided by the CBDR principle when participating in 
the projects, in which the philosophical notion of restoring equality is embedded, one could 
claim that the CDM, with the current flaws, rather furthers inequality among the parties. First, 
it increases the division between Annex I and non-Annex I countries when Annex I countries 
can benefit from a project although it fails to provide equal benefits and sustainable 
development in developing countries, and even make it harder for them to undertake 
mitigation actions. Secondly, it also furthers the division among developing countries since 
the projects are unevenly distributed. 
(ii) Flaws in relation to the ‟additional‟ requirement 
 
The additional criterion refers to the requirement that the emission reductions from the CDM 
project activities must be other than those which had occurred in the absent of the project.
362
 
In other words, the CDM projects must lead to emission reduction below a „business as usual‟ 
counterfactual baseline.
363
 This hypothetical baseline shall declare the amount of GHG 
emissions that would have been released in absent of the CDM project, which the reduction 
from a CDM project will be measured against.  
Thus, the „additional‟ GHG emissions “. . .can never be proven with absolute certainty.”
364
 
and is therefore difficult to assess. The uncertainties related to the assessment have allowed 
developing countries to „propose non-additional and „free rider‟ projects that would in fact 
have taken place anyway‟.
365
 The project proponents have a significant incentive to 
exaggerate their baseline in order to receive as many CERs as possible,
366
 because the 
more they can inflate their baseline, the more money they can earn.
367
 Wara states that this 
has resulted in a “. . .substantial strategic behaviour . . . aimed at manipulating 
baselines...”.
368
 Several studies and reports have also shown that the CDM approval 
process fails to screen out projects that in fact would have taken place without the CDM.
369
 
If Annex I countries receive CERs, and thereby will not need to carry out this amount of 
emission reductions domestically, despite the fact that the emission reduction in the host 
states would have occurred in the absent of a CDM project, the CDM project have actually 
resulted in a lower total global GHG emission reduction that the targets called for.  
Although the EB have endeavoured to improve the assessment by stringent requirements and 
standard calculation methodologies,
370
 by, for example, establishing an „additional tool‟ and a 
„combined tool for baseline selection and demonstration of additionality‟,
371
 the climate 
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regime has not provided any standard method for assessing the additionality of a CDM 
project.
372
 Therefore, the potential to abuse the mechanism remains.
373
 
Especially because of the uneven distribution and the failure to achieve additional emission 
reduction, and other revealed flaws in general, the CDM needs to be improved in order for it 
to be an efficient mechanism to enhance the mitigation action in developing countries. 
 
C. Recent developments 
 
The CMP.5 in Copenhagen, could present hope for the future of the mechanism as it 
addressed some of the most central problems with the CDM.  
For instance, the CMP requested the EB to further work on the „enhancement of objectivity 
and transparency in the approaches for demonstration and assessment of additionality and 
selection of baseline scenario‟
374
, as well as requesting the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice to recommend „modalities and procedures for the development of 
standardized baselines that are broadly applicable, while providing for a high level of 
environmental integrity and taking into account specific national circumstances‟.
375
 Hereby, 
the problems with the additional requirements are clearly acknowledged and addressed, and 
the work to make improvements are initiated.  
Regarding the aim to achieve sustainable development, the CMP, encouraged the Designated 
National Authorities to publish the criteria they use when assessing the sustainability of 
proposed CDM project.
376
 By publishing the criteria of the sustainability assessment, this 
could promote the DNAs to be more conscious on the importance of assessing this 
requirement properly, and thereby be a step in the right direction to ensure that the criteria of 
the DNAs are not too soft. 
Regarding regional and sub-regional distribution and capacity building, the CMP authorised 
the EB to prioritise the „consideration and development of baseline and monitoring 
methodologies that are applicable to under-represented project activity types and regions;
377
 
Furthermore, the CMP decided to defer the payment of the registration fee until after the first 
issuance for countries with fewer than 10 registered CDM projects. In addition, the EB was 
requested to developing top-down methodologies that are particularly suited for application in 
these countries
378
, and to allocate financial resources to provide loans to cover the costs of the 
development of project design documents, validation costs and the first verifications in 
relation to projects in countries with fewer than 10 registered CDM project activities.
379
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Finally, the DOEs were encouraged to establish offices in developing countries in order to 
reduce the transaction costs for these countries and to contribute to a more equitable 
distribution of the projects.
380
 All parties are also encouraged to continue to cooperate 
bilaterally to develop and implement CDM project activities, and in particular to facilitate 
South-South cooperation and capacity transfer.
381
 
This indicates that also the problem with the uneven distribution is recognised and responded 
on. What is especially interesting here is the encouragement to all parties to contribute to 
facilitate South-South cooperation and capacity transfer. This could be a sign of a new 
approach in the climate regime, where all parties that are capable to support the 
implementation of the provisions should be more actively involved. 
 There could be argued that this CMP decision thereby included a new element of differential 
treatment among developing countries, of which many developing countries generally, at least 
before Bali,
382
 have been reluctant to accept. Yet, this favourable treatment given to those 
countries with less than 10 registered projects cannot be seen as a direct respond to 
differences between these developing countries and others based on different degrees of 
responsibilities and different capacities, which the applied differential treatment in the climate 
regime is generally build on. Rather, this specific type of favourable treatment given in the 
context of CDM is obviously an adjustment of the mechanism necessary to ensure that all 
countries will have the opportunity to benefit from CDM projects, which in fact was the 
purpose of the mechanism in the first place.  
Future will tell if the new regulations will manage to ensure a broader distribution and 
improve the mechanisms in general. It must be fair to say that as long as the CDM is a 
market-based mechanism, the economic value of a project will continue to be the leading 
force, unless, as Voigt underline, the goal to achieve sustainable development and 
environmental integrity is ensured trough the mechanism‟s „regulatory framework and legal 
safeguards‟.
383
 Although the CMP in Copenhagen must be seen as a step in the right direction, 
the complexity and amount of flaws within the mechanism will require further elaboration in 
order for the CDM to be an efficient mechanism to enhance the involvement of developing 
countries in the future of the climate regime. 
 
2. New options for enhanced involvement by developing countries 
 
In order to explain the new options in a new agreement an historic overview over the 
development of the negotiations should be presented in order to put the assessment below into 
context. The preparation for the post-2012 agreement began at COP.11, in conjunction with 
the first CMP, due to the provision in the Kyoto Protocol requesting the CMP to initiate 
considerations on the post-2012 commitments for Annex I parties at least seven years before 
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the end of the first commitment period.
384
 A two-track approach was initiated: an „ad hoc 
working group of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol‟ (AWG-KP) to consider commitments for 
subsequent periods for Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol,
385
 and a „dialogue on 
long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the 
Convention‟ to further develop the provisions under the UNFCCC. 
 
The latter, was engaged 
by the COP to “. . . exchange experience and analyse strategic approaches for long-term 
cooperative action to address climate change. . . ”386 Some parties were sceptic that this would 
lead to new commitments for non-Annex I countries and pointed at the fact that Kyoto 
Protocol Article 3(9), which opens for subsequent commitment periods, only are addressed to 
Annex I countries.
387
 Therefore, this dialogue should not open any negotiations leading to 
new commitments,
388
 but, inter alia, identify approaches and conditions for voluntary actions 
by developing countries that promote local sustainable development and mitigate climate 
change in a manner „appropriate to national circumstances‟, especially actions in developing 
countries to adapt and manage climate change.
389
 The outcome of this COP indicated that a 
future agreement would follow the same path as the current regulations where developed 
countries have no binding commitments. Yet, it opened for enhanced involvement by 
developing countries concerning mitigation and adaption, and ensured that the parties started 
to explore future opportunities and approaches for a new agreement.  
Two years later, a program for the negotiations towards a post-2012 agreement was adopted, 
referred to as the Bali Action Plan (BAP).
390
 The COP transformed the „dialogue‟ into a 
negotiating body with clear mandate
391
 as they established a subsidiary body under the 
Convention named the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention (AWG-LCA) with the task to complete its work in 2009 and present the outcome 
of its work at COP-15 for adoption.
 392
 The Bali Action Plan addressed various issues central 
in a future agreement, and initiated the work towards: a shared vision for long-term 
cooperative action;
393
 enhanced national and international action on mitigation of climate 
change;
394
 enhanced action on adaption;
395
 enhanced action on technology development and 
transfer to support action on mitigation and adaptation;
396
 and, enhanced action on the 




 The enhanced national and international action on mitigation of climate change included, 
inter alia, considerations of „measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate 
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mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction 
objectives, by all developed country Parties‟ 
398
 (NAMAs by developed countries, including 
QELROs)‟; „nationally appropriate mitigation action by developing country Parties in the 
context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and 
capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner‟
399
 (NAMAs by 
developing countries); and „policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the 
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks in developing countries‟
400
 (REDD). 
The COP in Bali presented good hope for the further development of the climate regime, as it 
opened up new horizons for the negotiations.
401
 As developing countries showed a willingness 
to take on further actions, the BAP seemed to wipe out a major reason for the inefficiency of 
the current climate regime as their previous reluctance to take on mitigation commitments 
have been the main excuse for the developed countries to refuse to take on further 
commitments.
402
 Additionally, by using the terms „developed‟ and „developing countries‟ 
instead of the historic division of „Annex I‟ and „non-Annex I countries‟, the BAP opened for 
new combinations and grades of commitments for developing countries.
403
 This is especially 
interesting because, as discussed in the previous part of the paper, much of the criticism of the 
current climate regime have been related to the fact that it fails to reflect the differences 
between the various developing countries. The outcome of the COP in Bali indicated that the 
commitments in a new agreement would adjust the current differential treatment to reflect 
relevant differences between all countries. Yet, as Honkonen expresses it: “. . . [T]he grand 
division between developed and developing countries is likely to remain, but the door is open 




During the year 2008 there was a downturn in the climate policy process because the financial 
crisis displaced climate change issues from the main political concerns.
405
 Despite this, there 
were generally great expectations regarding the outcome of the fifteenth COP in Copenhagen, 
as this was when the new agreements was supposed to be adopted. Yet, even though both of 
the AWGs had drafted negotiation texts regarding new provisions, the parties did not reach an 
agreement. Instead, the COP took note of the Copenhagen Accord,
406
 which was drafted on 
the initiative from political leaders from only a few of the countries that are parties to the 
climate regime. In this accord, the scientific view that the global temperature should be below 
2 degrees Celsius in order to prevent dangerous interference with the climate system, was 
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 Furthermore, another interesting element was the expressed political will to 
enhance the long-term cooperative action to combat climate change through mitigation 
actions form both „Annex I Parties‟ and „Non-Annex I Parties‟,
408
 provided by „new and 
additional, predictable and adequate funding‟ to developing countries with a collectively 
contribution from developed countries approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012, 
and a goal of mobilising jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020.
409
 In addition, the 
crucial role of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to 
enhance removals of GHG emissions by forest was recognised.
410
 Still, as the accord is 
written in a guiding and vague language, it cannot be considered legally binding. In addition, 
although the accord now has been signed by many parties to the climate regime,
411
 it is still 
controversial to some parties. 
 The COP decided to prolong the mandate of the ad hoc working groups, and their work shall 
be presented at the sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties with the aim to be 
adopted.
412
 This work is what will be assessed below by studying some of the options for new 
regulations set out in BAP. All the addressed elements in BAP should be assessed to give a 
comprehensive analysis of the future adjustments of the differential treatment in a future 
agreement. However, to discuss all elements and details herein is far beyond the scope of this 
paper. Therefore, the focus will be on two of the elements under the issue „enhanced national 
and international action on mitigation on climate change‟, namely the „nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions by developing counties‟(NAMAs), and „reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries‟ (REDD).  
The purpose is not to give a full analysis and detailed presentation of all elements in these 
possible future regulations, but rather to look for signs of adjustments to the current 
differential treatment in the climate regime and assess whether such possible adjustments will 
be better in line with boundaries of differential treatment. Although it is left for the parties to 
decide on the definition and contents, and whether such regulations should be adopted at all, 
the language in the BAP itself gives some indication on what to expect. In addition, the 
negotiation texts of the AWG-LCA regarding the NAMAs by developing countries and 
REDD will be studied below, and primarily the latest preparation of a text to facilitate the 
negotiations among the parties at COP.16.
413
 
The Chair of the AWG-LCA were given the mandate to prepare this text, drawing upon the 
report of the AWG-LCA presented at COP.15, as well as the work undertaken by the COP on 
the basis of that report.
414
 The Chair has selected elements from the source material, which 
she considers most conductive to facilitate the parties towards an outcome to be presented at 
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 It is important to underline that new elements can be brought up during the 
further negotiations, and all the elements in the negotiation text will be subject to negotiations 
among the parties,
416
 which could lead to an outcome that is completely different than what 
this negotiation text indicates. However, as the text, in general, maintains the outcome of the 
COP.15,
417
 it serves as an updated „status rapport‟ on what the parties might be willing to 
include in the new regulations. Therefore, in lack of any substantial agreements, it serves as a 
relevant source when studying future options for enhanced mitigation actions in developing 
countries and the adjustments to the differential treatment embedded herein. I will first 
present most relevant elements of differential treatment that seems to be embedded in the 
NAMAs and the REDD individually, before the signs of adjustments to the current 
differential treatment will be summarised in a conclusion.  
 
A. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing countries 
 
 The BAP initiated the negotiations towards „nationally appropriate mitigation action by 
developing countries in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by 





 which has been referred to as a „make or break‟ formulation. 420  
The BAP does not define what activities should be included under these regulations, nor has 
this been defined in the negotiation texts, with the exception that it reads that developing 
countries are to prepare „low-emission developing plans‟.
421
 However, by being „mitigation 
actions‟ one must presume that they should have the primary aim to reduce GHG emissions, 
as „mitigation‟ is defined as: “. . . human interventions to reduce the emissions of greenhouse 
gases by sources or enhance their removal from the atmosphere by “sinks,”
422
 and “sink” 
refers to forests, vegetation or soils that can reabsorb CO2”.
423
 Still, it is unclear whether only 
activities that directly lead to emission reductions are included, or whether also activities that 
indirectly enable reductions could be regarded as „mitigation actions‟.
424
 In other words, a 
variety of different activities could be included in these regulations, but there are clear 
indications that the developing countries will be expected to undertake actions to reduce 
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 This is also a pointed out in the literature, see for instance, Murphy Et.al., supra note 262, at 15, where they 
state that NAMAs  could be policies, legal requirements and measures that integrate climate change 
considerations with national sustainable development policies, including individual action or a set of actions that 




emissions in a new agreement.
425
 Regarding the requirements for what the NAMAs must 
achieve, it is stated in one of two possible options for a new provision that the NAMAs are to 
be “. . .aimed at achieving a substantial deviation in emissions . . . relative to those emissions 
that would occur in the absence of enhanced mitigation. . . ”.
426
 This could be compared with 
the „additional‟ requirement for CDM projects. However, the other option does not define any 
requirements regarding the degree of reduction of GHG emissions, but simply state that the 
parties „will implement mitigation actions in the context of sustainable development‟.427 
The phrase „nationally appropriate. . . by developing countries‟ indicates that these activities 
are to be initiated by the developing countries themselves. This is also what the negotiation 
text points towards, as it is stated that developed countries „shall undertake‟
428
 or „will 
implement‟.
429
  More importantly, it indicates that it is up to each developing country to 
decide what kind of mitigation activities should be implemented on their territory. 
Consequently, it could be a variety of actions based on the individual developing country‟s 
capacity as well as those actions best suited to limit or reduce GHG emissions in the 
individual country based on where their emissions originates from. As pointed out by Ott, the 
NAMAs thereby open up for differentiation between developing countries, and could better 




While the language in BAP called for nationally appropriate „commitments or actions‟ by 
developing countries, including „quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives‟,
431
 it 
only called for „actions‟ by developing countries. This suggests that the mitigation 
commitments for developed countries still are to be legally binding. The negotiation text 
prepared for the COP.15 in Copenhagen stated that the NAMAs should be voluntary for all 
developing countries.
432
 However, in the newest negotiation text the legal status of the 
NAMAs  is not quite as clear. In one of two options it is stated that all developing countries 
„shall‟ undertake mitigation actions that are enabled and supported by developed countries, 
and in addition, they „may undertake autonomous mitigation actions‟.
433
 The other options 
state that developing countries „will‟ undertake mitigation actions, except least developing 
countries and small island developing countries, which „may undertake actions voluntarily 
and on the basis of support‟.
434
 This indicates that the NAMAs could be formed as 
commitments also for the developing countries. Furthermore, it shows signs of differentiation 
                                                     
425
 Birnie, Boyle and Redgewell have stated that the NAMAs by developing countries may be compared to the 
commitments in Article 10(b) of the Kyoto Protocol,
425
 which commit all parties to establish national 
programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change. However, they too see the language in BAP as an 
indication that developing countries are increasingly expected to be involved in mitigation efforts, and that it 
seems as concrete evidence of progress will be required of the NAMAs, see Bernie et.al., supra note 47, at 376. 
426
 FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/6, Annex I, Chapter I, para 10, Option 1. 
427
 Ibid., Option 2. 
428
 FCCC/AWGLA/2010/6, Annex I, Chapter I, para 10, Option 1 
429
 Ibid., para 10, Option 2. 
430
 Hermann E. Ott.”Global Climate” in Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Volume 18, 2008, at 
202. 
431
 Decision 1/COP.13 (FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1), para. 1(b) (i). 
432
 FCCC/AWL-GLA/2009/14, Section III, B, para. 5. 
433
 FCCC/AWGLA/2010/6, Annex I, Chapter I, para. 10, Option 1. 
434




among developing countries. Not only will the mitigation actions be „nationally appropriate‟ 
and thereby be individual for each state, these proposals show signs of possible further 
differentiation as those who can undertake mitigation actions without support can do so (and 
thereby might be expected to do more by the international community), and that those 
countries with the least capacity will have softer requirements. 
 
As the BAP included that the NAMAs should be „supported and enabled by technology, 
financing and capacity-building‟, it is clear that the developing countries‟ implementation of 
their commitments will continue to be dependent on support. The reference to support could 
refer to support provided within a country, support transferred from one developing country to 
another, and/or support from developed countries.
435
 In the newest negotiation text, one 
option contains both support from „domestic sources‟ and support form „developing 
countries‟,
436
 while another option refers to „international support‟
437
. Also mentioned in the 
text are „bilateral, regional and other multilateral sources of funding‟.
438
 Even though this 
show that support from developed countries would still be central, in keeping with the current 
„linking-clause‟ between developed and developing countries‟ implementation,
439
 it opens for 
support provided by developing countries as well. Developing countries supporting other 
developing countries would be a new element in the climate regime. If this is included in a 
new agreement, the new regulations thus could better reflect the actual capacity of each 
country and acknowledge that also some of the developing countries have experienced 
economic growth and development, and thereby could contribute – not only by reducing their 
emissions –  but also to give support to more disadvantaged countries. 
In the BAP, the NAMAs by developed countries are expressed as „measurable, reportable and 
verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions‟, while the NAMAs by 
developing countries should be „in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.‟ This 
could be compared with the current requirements on Annex B countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol to establish a national system for estimating their emissions according to 
methodologies agreed on by the CMP,
440
 and to include this information in their national 
communication to the CMP in order for the expert review teams to assess their 
implementation.
441
 Even though the concept needs to be clarified in relation to the NAMAs, 
the BAP indicated that there might be a distinction between developed and developing 
countries‟ requirements to estimate and report on their emission reductions. In the negotiation 
text it seems to be a general agreement on the requirement that the NAMAs by developed 
countries should „be measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing and any further 
guidelines. . .”442 In relation to the same requirement for the NAMAs by developing countries, the 
picture is more complex, and difficult to assess. However, it seems to be a distinction between 
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the NAMAs undertaken without support, and those who are supported by „developed 
countries‟ or „international support‟.
 443
 According to the negotiation text, the former should 
be subject to domestic measurement and verification, while the latter will be subject to 
international measurement, reporting and verification.
444
 How these requirements should be 
applied in the light of the CBDR principle has also been discussed at earlier stages in the 
negotiation process.
445
 As pointed out by Honkonen, such differences between developed and 
developing countries‟ would represent a new type of differential treatment in the climate 
regime.
446
  Although developing countries were given differentiated requirements regarding 
the submission of national reports under the UNFCCC
447
, differential procedural standards for 
emission reductions and their reporting would represent a new feature.
448
 She further stress 
that although lightened procedures would probably promote new emission reductions, the 




B. Reducing emission from deforestation and forest deforestation in developing 
countries 
 
The Bali Action initiated the negotiations towards „policy approaches and positive incentives 
on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in 
developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 





The concept of including reduction of emissions from deforestation in developing countries 
into the COP agenda was first proposed by Papa New Guinea and Costa Rica together with 
eight other countries from Latin America at the eleventh session of the COP in Montreal, 
2005.
452
 These parties highlighted here that emissions form deforestation in developing 
counties should be included in the climate regime in order to meet the ultimate objective of 
the UNFCCC.
 453
 The issues have been discussed since,
454
 but the parties have yet to reach an 
agreement on how these regulations should be formed.  
However, some decisions have been made regarding this issue. In order to understand the 
complexity of the problem and how it should be managed, the COP.13 in Bali requested the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to undertake a programme of work 
on the methodological issues, including inviting Parties to submit their views on how to 
address outstanding methodological issues, and to report the outcome of the workshop to the 
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 Furthermore, at the COP.15 in Copenhagen, the COP requested the developing 
countries to, inter alia, identify drivers of deforestation and forest degradation and the means 
to address these;
456
 to identify activities within the country that result in reduction of 
emissions and increased removals;
457
 and, to establish an national forest monitoring system.
458
 
An interesting feature in the COP decision was that the COP encouraged „all parties in 
position to do so‟ to support and strengthen the capacity of developing countries to develop 
estimates.
459
 The language herein is a sign that the actual capacity of the parties will be of 
increased importance in the future climate regime.  
Deforestation accounts for approximately 17-20 percent
460
 of the annual global GHG 
emissions. According to the IPCC, “forest related mitigation activities can considerably 
reduce emissions from sources and increase Co2 removals by sinks at low costs, and can be 
designed to create synergies with adaption and sustainable development.”
461
 They also state 
that “reduced deforestation and degradation is the forest mitigation option with the largest and 




These facts clearly show that if regulations to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation are included under the UNFCCC, this will not only be an important element to 
meet the ultimate objective, but it could also serve as a low-cost and effective mitigation 
alternative for developing countries. Reduced deforestation could be undertaken immediately 
using already known technologies,
463
 and therefore be suitable for enhanced mitigation action 
by developing countries since these countries generally lack resources to take on more 
complicated technical mitigation actions.   
Compared to the first introduction of the issue at COP. 11, the BAP defined the term more 
broadly and included a collection of several actions.
464
 The phrase „policy approaches‟, could 
include a variety of different policies and means. However, it is stated in the newest 
negotiation text, that developing countries should „contribute to mitigation actions in the 
forest sector‟ by undertake „activities‟ to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
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degradation, conservation of forest carbon stocks, sustainable management of forests, and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
465
  
The CMP  has defined „deforestation‟ as “. . .the direct human- induced conversion of 
forested land to non-forested land.‟
466
, while „forest‟ is defined as „a minimum area of land of 
0.05-1 hectares with tree crown cover (or equivalent stocking level) of more than 10-30 
percent with trees with the potential to reach a minimum height of 2-5 metres at maturity in 
situ‟.
467
 Still, „forest degradation‟ and other definitions regarding what the different activities 
refer to need to be agreed to by the parties. 
The lack of clear language specifying the „activities‟ must be seen in relation to the fact that 
causes of deforestation are „multiple, complex and are dissimilar from country to country‟.
468
 
Studies show that no universal policy for controlling deforestation can be conceived, and thus, 
the REDD mechanism must take into account the regional differences and interacting causes 
and enable „implementation of a variety of actions involving a number of actors at different 
levels‟.
469
   
The word „contribute‟ does not provide clarity on what exactly is expected by the parties. Yet, 
in the negotiation text is stated that the activities are to be “ . . .implemented in phases, 
beginning with the development of national strategies or action plans, policies and measures 
and capacity-building, followed by the implementation of national polices and measures, and 
national strategies or actions plans and, as appropriate, subnational strategies, that could 
involve further capacity-building, technology development and transfer and result-based 
demonstration activities, and evolving into results-based actions...”.
470
 Furthermore, it is 
stated that the implementation, „including the choice of starting phase‟, depends on „the 
specific national circumstances, capacities and capabilities of each developing country Party 
and the level of support received‟.
471
 This indicates that the developing countries will have 
different commitments in relation to the REDD mechanism, which could ensure that their 
commitments are adjusted according to their actual capacities. The REDD mechanism could 
thereby ensure a more flexible type of differential treatment, which, as discussed in part IV 
above, will be an improvement of the current approach. 
The developing countries have generally expressed “. . . that they want to be “paid” for their 
participation in the climate regime”.
472
 The BAP stated that the negotiation also should be 
concentrated on „positive incentives‟. Positive incentives is generally seen to mean benefits, 
more specifically „financial flows‟
473
 or „benefits in form of financial incentives‟
474
 to the 
developing countries that undertake REDD activities. „Positive incentives‟ could also include 
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 The REDD concept has been described to build on the idea that “. . . 
forests will contribute to climate change mitigation only if their value increased to a level that 
makes protecting forests consistent with viable development strategies”.
476
 It is stated in the 
negotiation text that the‟ promotion and implementation‟ of all activities should be 
supported.
477
 How and on what grounds they should be supported is still unclear. Earlier in 
the negotiation process, the main options for financial incentives have been either a market 
approach or funding. The negotiation text mentions a combination of funds and market based 




C. Conclusion: The signs of adjustments to the current differential treatment 
 
The most obvious adjustment of the current differential treatment will be that Annex I parties 
are no longer the only countries expected to undertake mitigation action under the climate 
regime. This new approach would be better in line with the scientific research indicating that 
enhanced global mitigation actions are needed, and thus developed countries alone cannot 
prevent dangerous interference with the climate system. These new provisions, if adopted, 
could thereby present an improvement of the efficiency of the climate regime, and thereby 
also be better in line with the boundary of differential treatment required to fulfil the ultimate 
objective of the climate regime. 
However, it is clear that favourable treatment to developing countries still will be a central 
part of the new agreement as well. First, it is likely that the differential commitments will 
continue as the BAP call for „commitments or actions, including quantified emission 
limitation and reduction objectives‟ for developed countries, and simply „actions‟ by 
developing countries. Even though the negotiation text indicates that the NAMAs by 
developing countries will be formed as commitments, it is unlikely that they will have as 
strong obligations as the developed countries. The negotiation text show no signs of 
individual quantified targets for developing countries, and thus, that these commitments 
should be legally binding and enforceable. Therefore, even if all parties would have 
mitigation commitments under a new agreement, the degree of the commitments on 
developed and developing countries would still be differentiated.  Secondly, it clear that the 
NAMAs  are to be „enabled and supported‟ and the REDD includes „positive incentives‟,  the 
developing countries will still be granted assistance from the developed world. Finally, as the 
developing countries requirements regarding procedural standards and reporting regarding 
seems to be differentiated between the developed and developing countries, a possible new 
type of differential treatment in favour of the developed countries could be included in the 
future of the climate regime. 
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As the REDD mechanism and the NAMAs will require further cooperation between the 
parties regarding mitigation action and a more active involvement of all, one could say that 
the parties common responsibilities seems to be increased in a new agreement. On the other 
hand, the responsibilities of the developed countries would now be reflected and responded to 
by even more stringent mitigation obligations as well as enhanced assistance commitments to 
support the enhanced mitigation commitment of the developing countries. The differences 
between the parties will thus still be taken into account, but the differential treatment will be 
applied in a different way than before where the developing countries have been without 
mitigation commitments. 
By being „nationally appropriate‟, both the NAMAs by developing countries and the NAMAs 
by developed countries would require different types and degree of activities in the individual 
countries, which could ensure that the countries‟ commitments would be bases on what is an 
appropriate level of action for each country according to their contribution to the problem and 
their capacity to tackle it. Furthermore, in order to be „appropriate‟ at all times, the 
commitments could therefore be adjusted in relation to the change of circumstances in the 
countries. A such flexible approach of differential treatment would therefore ensure that the 
differential treatment would „cease to exist when the differences cease to exist‟, and thereby 
would be within this limit of differential treatment as well.   
A new and important element of the NAMAs and the REDD mechanism is that the 
differential treatment will not only be distinguished between developed and developing 
countries, but also among the developing countries. First, as stated above, the NAMAs could 
ensure that the mitigation action in each country where based on the relevant national 
circumstances. The REDD mechanism would also require different activities in the different 
countries, and thereby the level of involvement in the developing countries would be 
differentiated. Furthermore, the negotiation text shows signs of differentiation among 
developing countries regarding the level of actions required. In relation to the NAMAs it is 
open for those countries with better capacity to undertake mitigation action without support, 
and, more importantly, the regulations could reflect the special situation of particularly 
vulnerable countries, like the least developed countries and the small island developing states, 
by giving them less stringent commitments. Based on the signs in the negotiation text, the 
developing countries would be clearly differentiated under the REDD mechanism since the 
parties‟ implementation of the REDD activities will be divided based on different „phases‟. If 
this would be included in a new agreement, the developing countries commitments would be 
differentiated according to the „specific national circumstances, capacities and capabilities in 
each developing country‟. This would thereby be a clear shift of approach in relation to the 
current differential treatment where all developing countries are treated similarly despite their 
vast differences. This would therefore be in line with the notion of justice requiring that those 
dissimilarly situated should be treated dissimilarly. 
Even though it is not explicitly stated in the BAP, nor in the negotiation text, from which 
countries the resources to „support and enable‟ the NAMAs by developing countries, or 
provide the „positive incentives‟ under the REDD mechanism, should come from, it is 




requiring the richest developing countries to support the other developing countries in their 
implementation. This is also in harmony with the signals from the COP and CMP in 
Copenhagen. When the COP decision in relation to the REDD encouraged „all parties in 
position to do so to support and strengthen the capacity of developing countries‟, it clearly 
indicated that the involvement by the parties to the climate change should be better adjusted to 
the actual capacity of each country, regardless if it is listed in an Annex or not. This is also 
supported by the fact that the CMP encouraged all parties to contribute to facilitate South-
South cooperation and capacity transfer in relation to the CDM. This would be an additional 
adjustment to the current differential treatment that only requires the Annex II countries to 
support developing countries.  
To sum up, in light of the signals in the BAP and the latest negotiation text by the AWG-
LCA, the new options for enhanced mitigation actions in developing countries could possibly 
adjust the current differential treatment under the climate regime, and consequently be better 
in line with the three boundaries of differential treatment. Overall, the capacity and actual 
circumstances in each country would be taken into account, rather than the current approach 
which is based on a distinction of Annex I and non-Annex I countries. This gives hope for a 
more efficient and fair differential treatment in the climate regime in the future.  
Future will tell if the NAMAs and REDD regulations will be voluntarily or formed as legally 
binding commitments for at least some of the developing countries. It will then be interesting 
to see whether non-Annex I countries also will be subject for enforcement consequences, or 
whether the differential treatment between developed and developing countries‟ regarding 
non-compliance consequences will continue with the current approach.   
Finally it should also be noted that if the NAMAs and REDD activities are to be financed 
through a market based approach, the lessons learned in relation to the flaws with the CDM 
should be taken into consideration. The purpose of the NAMAs would likely be, as with the 
CDM, to achieve emission reduction and at the same time ensure sustainable development. 
The REDD would also have multiple objectives, for instance to reduce emissions from 
deforestation as well as to respect the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and 
members of local communities.
479
 It should therefore be ensured under these regulations that 
all the objectives are respected, rather than neglected due to strong economic interests. This is 
also highlighted by Stockwell, Hare and Macey, concluding that: “[a] market mechanism will 
procedure only what which has economic value, unless the design of the mechanism clearly 
requires other deliverables in a measureable, reportable and verifiable manner.” It is 
therefore the task of the parties to agree on rules that protect the compliance with all of the 
several purposes that probably will be included in the NAMAs and REDD provisions. 
Furthermore, regulations should also be made to ensure an even distribution of the financial 
resources to all the developing countries if a market based approach is chosen. 
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I started this paper with the words “There is now a worldwide consensus that climate change 
has become a global challenge that requires international action to be solved.”  
Although the climate regime has almost universal participation, the current differential 
treatment is not providing a sufficient level of international action in order to solve the climate 
change challenge. Thus, the differential treatment has gone too far. Enhanced global 
mitigation actions by developing countries are required in order to meet the objective of the 
treaty. Even though it is too early to conclude on what the contents of a new agreement will 
be, the Bali Action Plan and the later negotiations show signs of a new approach.  
One could therefore say that we are moving towards a new era of differential treatment in the 
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EB   Executive Board 
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GWP   Global warming potential 
IPCC    Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
NAMAs   Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
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REDD   Reducing Emissions form Deforestation and forest Degradation 
UNFCCC   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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